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FISCAL WAIVERS AND STATE “INNOVATION” IN
HEALTH CARE

MATTHEW B. LAWRENCE*
ABSTRACT
This Article describes how the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) has used fiscal waiver authorities—delegated power
to alter federal payments to states under Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act (ACA)—to influence state health policy choices. It
highlights how the agency uses its fiscal waiver authorities to shape
which reforms states choose to pursue, in some cases inspiring
genuine state innovation and in others encouraging states to adopt
reforms favored by HHS or discouraging states from adopting
disfavored reforms. Moreover, while HHS has sometimes influenced
state policy making in ways that further the substantive goals of the
ACA and Medicaid (such as by facilitating reinsurance programs
that make coverage more affordable), at other times it has done so in
ways that undermine those goals (such as by incentivizing states to
cut benefits and eligibility or by stifling state single-payer and
public-option experiments).
This Article theorizes fiscal waiver authorities as a double-edged
tool from the perspectives of health policy, federalism, and administrative law. Fiscal waiver authorities are a distinctively valuable
tool from the standpoint of health policy because they share federal
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savings, using delegated scorekeeping to overcome the “tyranny of the
budget” and its adverse effects on health reform. But the informality
currently surrounding the agency’s use of executive conditions on
waiver approvals makes fiscal waiver authorities ripe for leveraging
and abuse, raising health policy, federalism, and administrative
law concerns.
This Article concludes by offering concrete prescriptions for the
next phase of health reform, which is poised to rely heavily on either
existing fiscal waivers or new ones. It recommends that HHS bring
greater formality to its process for approving, denying, or negotiating
state waiver requests and cautions that if the agency does not do so
then courts may force such formality on it by way of nondelegation,
federalism, or administrative law doctrine. It also suggests the
development of a pioneer pathway program with greater predictability and fiscal flexibility to facilitate health-promoting state innovations.
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INTRODUCTION
The interaction between fiscal federalism and state innovation
has received insufficient attention in prior scholarship.1 This Article is the first to focus on a particularly important legal tool in this
interaction that is reshaping both federalism and health policy
today: fiscal waiver authorities in health care. Fiscal waiver authorities are statutory delegations of discretion to agencies to alter
the terms of the fiscal relationship between the federal government
and states from a legislative baseline. This Article describes how the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has used fiscal
waiver authorities in Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
to influence state health policy choices; to draw general implications
for law and legal scholarship; and to develop specific prescriptions
for courts, HHS, and Congress.
This Article’s study of fiscal waiver authorities in health care
demonstrates that an agency can use such authorities to influence
which reforms states pursue in two distinct but overlapping ways:
inspiring and steering. Inspiration entails an agency incentivizing
state development of novel reforms, spurring the “laboratories of
democracy.” Steering entails an agency directing state behavior
through implicit or explicit conditions on fiscal waiver approvals,
just as Congress steers states when it creates legislative conditions
on spending awards for states.
Fiscal waivers’ use to inspire and induce state policy making in
health care implicates two primary sets of issues. The first set of
issues stems from the way the delegation of discretion over spending
from Congress to HHS impacts how the federal government decides
whether to invest in health and health care. Here fiscal waivers
appear in a positive light. Scholars increasingly appreciate how
scorekeeping rules in the congressional budget process have held
back and warped health reform.2 Fiscal waivers are a distinctive
1. See Robert A. Schapiro, States of Inequality: Fiscal Federalism, Unequal States, and
Unequal People, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1531, 1536 (2020) (“We have concentrated too much
attention on constitutional doctrine and not enough on money.”); David A. Super, Rethinking
Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2549, 2652 (2005) (calling for greater attention
in federalism scholarship to fiscal issues).
2. William M. Sage, No, the ACA Isn’t “Unconstitutional”: Ends and Means in a

1482

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1477

and valuable tool in health policy because they reduce these scorekeeping barriers. They delegate the task of measuring a state
reform’s financial costs and benefits to the agency at the time it
considers the waiver request, rather than to congressional scorekeepers at the time legislation is considered, making it easier to
identify and unlock federal funds for worthwhile health investments.
Delegating discretion over spending on states from Congress to
HHS raises a second set of issues relating to the way HHS exercises
that discretion. HHS can use its power to deny lawful waivers or
sculpt payments to states through waivers, thereby shaping states’
financial incentives. Such steering can be fraught. HHS can encourage states to cut benefits and eligibility by molding their incentives; the Trump administration sought to use fiscal waivers in
this way.
Moreover, the agency can influence states through hidden conditions on waiver awards—that is, conditions that are not necessarily public and not necessarily written. While only one state to date
has challenged the use of hidden conditions on fiscal waivers in a
lawsuit it eventually dropped, the threat of future such challenges
leaves current fiscal waiver practice legally vulnerable on federalism, nondelegation, and administrative law grounds.
Ultimately, this Article endorses fiscal waivers in theory for their
distinctive ability to circumvent the tyranny of the budget but calls
for close scrutiny of their use to influence state policy choices in
practice. This means scrutiny not just of agency decisions approving states’ fiscal waiver requests but also, and especially, scrutiny

Dysfunctional Democracy, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Dec. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Sage, Ends and
Means], https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20181219.912615/full/ [https://perma.
cc/URC6-UP2E] (using “tyranny of the budget” as shorthand for stifling effect of budget rules
on health reform); William M. Sage & Timothy M. Westmoreland, Following the Money: The
ACA’s Fiscal-Political Economy and Lessons for Future Health Care Reform, 48 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 434 (2020); Timothy Westmoreland, Invisible Forces at Work: Health Legislation and
Budget Processes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 873 (I. Glenn Cohen et al.
eds., 2017) (arguing that budget process rules have shaped health reform); William M. Sage,
Adding Principles to Pragmatism: The Transformative Potential of “Medicare-for-All” 14-15,
23-24 (Feb. 2020) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Sage, Adding Principles to
Pragmatism], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3387120 [https://perma.cc/
TT5D-FSBT] (describing importance of tyranny of the budget in shaping health reform).
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of agency decisions denying such requests (including conditions the
agency puts on approval).
Fiscal waiver authorities are not just an abstract concept. They
are already a driving force in health care. The federal government’s
$1.28 trillion in health care spending annually represents 36
percent of costs nationwide.3 (This share will only grow, and the
federal government would pay 100 percent of Americans’ health care
costs (accounting for 18 percent of GDP) under prominent “Medicare
for All” proposals.)4 The Trump administration leveraged this fact
to use fiscal waiver authorities to drive its agenda, pressuring states
to cut benefits and eligibility in Medicaid and the ACA with the
promise of a share of the resulting federal savings.5 Indeed, all but
one “state innovation waiver” granted to states under the ACA to
date has been stimulated by states’ desire for increased federal
funding.6 Yet fiscal waiver authorities have been ignored in legal
scholarship on the very “big waiver” provisions in which they play
a load-bearing part, which has continued an unfortunate trend in
legal scholarship to focus on regulatory matters to the exclusion of
fiscal matters.7
3. See infra notes 166-73 and accompanying text (breaking down federal role in healthcare spending); infra Table 1. This number reflects an average because the federal government shoulders a much larger fraction of medical costs in some states than others. See
Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1579 (problematizing this fact).
4. See Medicare for All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. (2019) (universal national
coverage bill proposed by Senator Sanders); Medicare for All Act of 2019, H.R. 1384, 116th
Cong. (2019) (universal national coverage bill proposed by Representative Jayapal); Matej
Mikulic, U.S. Health Care Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP 1960-2020, STATISTA (June
8, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/184968/us-health-expenditure-as-percent-of-gdpsince-1960/ [https://perma.cc/45UZ-736U] (describing health care as share of gross domestic
product).
5. E.g., Abby Goodnough, Trump Administration Unveils a Major Shift in Medicaid, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/30/health/medicaid-block-granttrump.html [https://perma.cc/KJ24-JTMJ]; Robert Pear, Trump Administration Approves
Medicaid Work Requirements in Utah, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/03/29/us/politics/medicaid-trump-utah.html [https://perma.cc/PRS5-4XXR]. On the legal
authorities and reforms behind these headlines, see infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2.
6. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (explaining role of fiscal waiver authority
in state reforms under ACA). The fiscal waiver authority has been a driving force in Medicaid
as well. See infra Part I.B (explaining significance of Medicaid’s fiscal waiver authority).
7. The leading article on “big waiver” is illustrative in that it offers a careful, detailed
description of the ACA’s state innovation waiver provision, 42 U.S.C. § 18052, that does not
mention the fiscal waiver authority included in that provision. David J. Barron & Todd D.
Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 281-82 (2013); see also id. at 291
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The coronavirus pandemic has underscored the need for greater
understanding of legal tools that facilitate investment in health
and health care despite a (rightly or wrongly) constrained fiscal environment. It has laid bare the spillovers and fragmentation associated with overlapping federal and state responsibility in health
and health care,8 the resulting lack of investment in public health
and the social determinants of health,9 and the disparate impact of
this lack of investment on people of color.10 This Article’s proposed
pioneer pathway, a fiscal waiver tailored to promote transparency
and avoid abuse, could begin to restore accountability while inspiring health and health care investment by breaking down fiscal
barriers.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I introduces fiscal waiver
authorities in health care. It summarizes the focus of “big waiver”
(defining “big waiver” as the power “to displace a regulatory baseline that Congress itself has
established”). Critiques of Barron and Rakoff’s analysis follow their regulatory focus. E.g.,
Yair Sagy, A Better Defense of Big Waiver: From James Landis to Louis Jaffe, 98 MARQ. L.
REV. 697, 698-99 n.1 (2014) (adopting Barron and Rakoff’s understanding of big waiver
authorities as granting agencies the “power to displace the regulatory baseline set by
Congress” (emphasis added)); Edward H. Stiglitz, Forces of Federalism, Safety Nets, and
Waivers, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 125, 127 (2017) (focusing on regulatory waiver
authorities); Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur & Health Reform Preemption, 78
OHIO STATE L.J. 1099, 1129-33 (2017); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes
to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953, 977-78 (2016); Bruce P. Frohnen, Waivers, Federalism, and
the Rule of Law, 45 PERSPS. ON POL. SCI. 59, 60 (2016); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by
Waiver After the Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 227, 228-30 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013). That is not
to say that the analyses in these treatments are not invaluable in evaluating fiscal waiver
authorities (they are); this Article discusses ways that the distinction between regulatory and
fiscal authorities makes a difference, see infra Part III. Meanwhile, another important line
of health law scholarship has analyzed aspects of Medicaid and ACA waiver authorities,
including their fiscal components but has not focused on these fiscal components or sought to
put them in conversation with more general “big waiver” scholarship. E.g., Abbe R. Gluck &
Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Health Care for?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1796 (2018)
(stating that the federal government’s “negotiating levers” include “regulatory policy and
budget generosity”); Lindsay F. Wiley, Medicaid for All? State-Level Single-Payer Health Care,
79 OHIO STATE L.J. 843, 878 (2018) (noting importance of funding mechanisms to the viability
of state single-payer efforts but taking existing funding flows as largely a given); Kristin
Madison, Building a Better Laboratory: The Federal Role in Promoting Health System
Experimentation, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 765, 791 (2014) (describing role of ACA funding flexibility
in nurturing state experimentation).
8. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1 (describing spillovers and fragmentation).
9. See infra notes 152-61 and accompanying text (describing underinvestment).
10. Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Law, Structural Racism, and the COVID-19
Pandemic, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES, June 29, 2020.
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scholarship on regulatory waiver authorities—which permit an
agency to alter the rules set by Congress—in the ACA, Medicaid,
and other intrastatutory federalism programs.11 It then explains
that the ACA and the Medicaid statute also include fiscal waiver authorities—which permit an agency to alter the payments to
states from a default set by Congress—and describes the paramount
role such authorities play in health reform.
Part II distinguishes two uses of fiscal waiver authorities to influence state policy choices. HHS has used fiscal waiver authorities
to inspire state innovation and also to steer states to adopt federally
selected reforms and abandon federally disfavored reforms. Part II
explains that this use of fiscal waiver authorities under the Trump
administration raises concerns from both substantive and structural
perspectives. The administration used fiscal waiver authorities to
inspire states to cut benefits and eligibility and also to coerce states
to adopt particular agency-selected reforms that further that end
rather than other reforms, such as state-based single payer, which
could create federal savings by improving health or health care.
Part III discusses implications for several threads of legal scholarship. Health and fiscal law scholars have lamented that scorekeeping rules distort and depress health reform; fiscal waivers delegate
scorekeeping and thereby circumvent this barrier to new investment. But this perk does not make fiscal waivers simply another
argument in favor of “big waiver.” The use of fiscal waivers to inspire and steer state policy raises distinctive federalism, administrative law, and substantive concerns that complicate the normative
analysis developed in this literature. In particular, this use underscores the necessity of scrutinizing waiver denials and threatened
denials, not just waiver approvals.
Part IV turns to the potential for legal controversy surrounding
agency-imposed conditions on waiver approval. It explains that the
lack of formality surrounding fiscal waiver deliberations might lead
courts to scrutinize executive conditions under federalism, nondelegation, and administrative law doctrines. It then recommends

11. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 542 (2011)
(describing intrastatutory federalism as state flexibility within federal statutory programs).
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HHS bring greater formality to its administration of fiscal waivers
to reduce that risk.
Part V concludes on an upbeat note, addressing the possibility of
new fiscal waiver authorities in future health reform legislation. It
explains that an expanded federal role in health care would in some
ways deepen the problem that budget rules pose for health investment, because states would retain primary responsibility for the
health of their populations but have reduced financial incentive and
fiscal capability to invest therein. Part V therefore derives from this
Article’s discussion a set of statutory constraints to frame a pioneer
pathway in future health reform legislation that would empower
agencies to share federal savings from state health investments
with states as a bridge to transformative state investment, without
risking abuse.
A note about generalizability. This Article builds on health law,
federalism, and administrative law scholars’ converging insight that
“structural” matters should not necessarily be understood in isolation from substance.12 Its core subject matter is the fiscal components of two of the “big waiver” provisions described above, which
provisions are explicitly described as “waivers” by statute and by
scholars. By focusing on these particular authorities, this Article
aspires to offer concrete substantive takeaways for health law and
also derive theoretical insights for broader issues of federalism and
administrative law.13 A conclusion summarizes this contribution.
12. Because normative commitments and operational realities differ from one area of
regulation to another, a legal structure that works well in one domain, such as in regulating
immigration, may not necessarily work well in another, such as health, the environment, or
national security. Both federalism and administrative law theory can be helpfully drawn from
analysis of particular policy domains, and normative insights may well be limited to such
domains. See, e.g., Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 7, at 1704-05, 1719-24 (discussing the need
to focus on particular subject matter areas in assessing federalism arrangements); Andrew
Hammond, Welfare and Federalism’s Peril, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1724-27 (2017) (describing
the “need for case-specific federalism”); Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2012) (“Such debates ... can only be hashed out in context—domain
by domain, policymaking arena by policymaking arena.”).
13. Some of what this Article draws from its study of fiscal waivers in health care could
apply to other broad delegations to agencies of authority over spending, especially grants to
states. The potential for an agency to wield discretion over funding to inspire or induce states
developed in Part II may theoretically be present anywhere an executive agency has broad
discretion over such grants. This category presumably overlaps closely with the category of
cases that present the “Pennhurst/Chevron problem”—that is, cases presenting the statutory
interpretation question whether the Pennhurst clear statement rule for conditions on federal
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I. BIG WAIVER IS BIG MONEY
A growing body of scholarship has discussed administrative “big
waiver” authorities.14 These are statutory provisions that permit
states to request, and federal agencies to grant, changes in the
default operation of major federal statutory programs. Health law
waivers in the ACA and Medicaid are core authorities evaluated in
such scholarship.15
This scholarship has focused on regulatory components of waiver
authorities—that is, provisions delegating to agencies the power to
depart from mandatory rules set by federal law.16 At least in health
care, this focus misses a big part of the story: money and its influence on state policy choices. The “big waiver” provisions in health
care do more than delegate to agencies the power to change the
default statutory requirements set out in federal law. These provisions also delegate the power to change federal funding flows to
states from the statutory default.
Indeed, in health care the most important thing about “big
waiver” has arguably been the power to change the fiscal relationship between the federal government and states, not the power to
change legal requirements, because of the extent to which fiscal
authorities permit HHS to influence state policy choices. It is not
spending or Chevron deference rule for agency interpretations of statutes should apply. David
Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Analysis
of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197 (2004).
Courts and scholars might consider whether the risk that agencies could leverage any
interpretive discretion they have over federal spending flows to states as described here
counsels against Chevron deference, because such deference expands the range of executive
discretion. I take up a closely related argument drawing on themes from this Article in
Congress’ Domain: Appropriations, Time, and Chevron, 70 DUKE L.J. 1057 (2021). Moreover,
the potential of delegated scorekeeping to overcome fiscal obstacles to reform developed in
Part III.B may be present anywhere that statutes constrain a delegation of authority in
permanent law to an agency to alter federal spending by requiring the agency not wield the
power in any way that increases the federal deficit.
14. See supra note 7 (collecting sources).
15. See Stiglitz, supra note 7, at 131-39 (discussing Medicaid waivers); McCuskey, supra
note 7, at 1129-33 (discussing ACA waivers); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 7, at 977-79
(discussing ACA and Medicaid waivers); Frohnen, supra note 7, at 59-60; Barron & Rakoff,
supra note 7, at 281-84, 299 (discussing ACA and Medicaid waivers); Bagenstos, supra note
7, at 228-30 (discussing Medicaid waivers).
16. See supra note 7 (collecting sources).
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just big waiver, it is big money. Section A explains that the ACA’s
waiver includes not only a regulatory authority (to change federal
law) but a fiscal authority as well (to change federal spending).17
Section B explains that the same is true of Medicaid’s waiver; it
includes not only a regulatory authority (to change federal law) but
a fiscal authority as well (to change federal spending).18 This Article
then turns to unpacking these authorities in Part II, discussing
their theoretical implications in Part III, and offering prescriptions
for looming legal controversies relating to fiscal waivers in Parts IV
and V.
A. Affordable Care Act Pass Through
Ten years after the ACA’s enactment, the law’s fiscal waiver authority is proving key in state innovation. As anyone who has had
the pleasure of reading National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius or King v. Burwell knows well, the ACA seeks to
breathe life into the “individual marketplace” where people go to
buy health insurance if they do not have it through Medicare (old
aged and disabled), Medicaid (low-income), their employer, or some
other source.19 It prohibits pre-existing condition exclusions in the
individual market and heavily limits premium rating, among other
requirements.20
Federal dollars are the lifeblood of the ACA’s individual markets.
The law creates income-based subsidies (available for those who
make less than 400 percent of the federal poverty level, or $104,800
for a family of four in 2020) for those who do not have insurance
from another source.21 For such individuals, the federal government
17. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1332(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(3).
18. See Social Security Act § 1115, 42 U.S.C. § 1315.
19. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 539-40 (2012) (discussing the
purposes of ACA); King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015); 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(C) (laying out
the purposes of ACA); Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual
Pluralism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1908-11
(2011) (discussing financial security as one of three conceptual purposes of ACA’s insurance
expansion).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1, 300gg-3, 300gg-4(a).
21. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401, 26 U.S.C. § 36B; Federal
Poverty Level (FPL), HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/federal-povertylevel-fpl/ [https://perma.cc/ASM5-4L3N] (stating that in 2020, the federal poverty level was
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pays a share of their premiums on individual market coverage
through a premium tax credit payable to their insurer.22 Moreover,
for a subset of such individuals (those making less than 250 percent
of the federal poverty level), the federal government makes “cost
sharing reduction” payments directly to insurers to compensate the
insurers for reducing their copays, deductibles, and coinsurance.23
Through the ACA the federal government paid $54 billion in medical costs to subsidize coverage for 87 percent of enrollees in 2018.24
Section 1332 of the ACA is the law’s “big waiver” provision; it
allows HHS to grant states’ requests for “innovation waivers” to
reform their individual markets.25 This provision’s regulatory
waiver authority permits changes to certain requirements in the
individual market.26 This provision’s fiscal waiver authority has
been used to “pass through” to states savings to the federal government associated with reforms that reduce federal subsidy costs.27
The statute explicitly caps pass-through payments at the amount of
predicted federal spending absent a waiver.28
The fiscal waiver authority in section 1332, not the provision’s
regulatory waiver authority,29 has driven all but one ACA state
innovation waiver to date. Such waivers have built on an idea first
proposed and successfully implemented by Alaska. Alaska received
shared federal savings through section 1332 to set up a “reinsurance”-type program, in which the state agrees to take on financial
responsibility for the highest-cost insureds who enroll through the
exchange for that state.30 This significantly brings down premiums
$26,200 for a family of four).
22. § 1401; § 1412.
23. Id. § 1402.
24. See Early 2019 Effectuated Enrollment Snapshot, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/early-2019-effectuatedenrollment-snapshot [https://perma.cc/9PHB-5PMW]; infra Table 1.
25. § 1332.
26. § 1332(a)(1).
27. § 1332(a)(3); see also State Relief and Empowerment Waivers, 83 Fed. Reg. 53,575,
53,580 (Oct. 24, 2018) (describing sharing, referred to as “pass-through” of savings).
28. § 1332(a)(3).
29. See infra note 37.
30. Letter from Governor Bill Walker to Lina Rashid, Senior Pol’y Advisor, Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (July 31, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-andInitiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/Alaska-STCs-signed-by-Treasury.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5VHB-2776] (accepting final terms and conditions of waiver approval).
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in the state, because insurers have to charge enough in premiums
to cover their predicted costs and the reinsurance program permits
insurers to ignore the highest-cost individuals when making that
calculation.31 By reducing premiums, the reinsurance program increases affordability and thereby increases enrollment, as people
who could not afford costlier premiums are able to buy into the
plan.32 This is good for everyone; it just requires the state to find the
money to cover the medical care that the highest-cost insureds incur.
Alaska’s reinsurance program would not have been possible
without a section 1332 waiver. This is not because the program violated federal law and so required a regulatory waiver; it did not.33
The program would not have been possible because it cost Alaska a
lot of money that Alaska could not afford, no matter how beneficial
to its residents the program would be.34 This Alaska stated in an application for a fiscal waiver that sought shared federal savings and
explained that, by reducing premiums, the reinsurance program
would reduce federal expenditures on subsidies for such premiums
(received by most enrollees). Although Alaska’s innovative proposal
was submitted at the close of the Obama administration, it was

31. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ALASKA: STATE INNOVATION WAIVER UNDER
SECTION 1332 OF THE PPACA (2017) [hereinafter ALASKA: STATE INNOVATION WAIVER],
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/
Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9Bu-YZ8G]; § 1312(c)(1).
32. ALASKA: STATE INNOVATION WAIVER, supra note 31.
33. Alaska’s waiver application initially sought to waive a provision of law Alaska
described in its application as not relevant to its waiver. See Letter from Governor Bill Walker
to Sylvia Mathews Burwell, HHS Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.commerce.alaska.
gov/web/Portals/11/Pub/Headlines/Alaska%201332%20State%20Innovation%20Waiver%20
June%2015%202017.pdf?ver=2017-06-26-091456-033 [https://perma.cc/BU9S-ATDV] (“Alaska
is seeking to waive Section 1301(a)(2) of the [ACA] which would have allowed the state to
establish a CO-OP or Community Health Option. The majority of CO-OPs that were created
after the enactment of the ACA have failed, and it is not feasible that one will be established
in Alaska. Waiving this provision will not have an impact on the healthcare market in
Alaska.”). The application was ultimately revised to request a waiver of a requirement that
insurers consider all enrollees in the individual market to be members of the same risk pool
but stated that “[n]o other section of the ACA would be affected by the proposed waiver.”
ALASKA DEP’T OF COM., CMTY., & ECON. DEV., DIV. OF INS., ALASKA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION
13 (2016) [hereinafter ALASKA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION], https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/
web/Portals/11/Pub/Headlines/Alaska%201332%20State%20Innovation%20Waiver%20Jun
e%2015%202017.pdf?ver=2017-06-26-091456-033 [https://perma.cc/BU9S-ATDV].
34. ALASKA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 33, at 6.
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ultimately approved by the Trump administration, and Alaska received millions in federal savings to fund the program.35
Alaska’s reinsurance program has kicked off a cascade of state
innovation, as state after state has proposed and requested federal
dollars for similar programs.36 At this writing, sixteen states have
received waivers granting them new federal funds in an amount
equal to the predicted reduction in federal subsidy payments created
by such reforms, and several more are in the works.37 States have
explained that this financial reward has been outcome-determinative in permitting them to adopt reinsurance reforms.38 The
numbers tell the same story. New Jersey’s reinsurance program
entitled it to shared savings in the form of pass through of over $188
million in 2019.39 Maryland’s generated the largest savings, receiving $373 million.40
Building on the fiscal focus of the Alaska-type waivers, HHS is
now encouraging and states are developing new state health
reforms that are also fueled by the potential for federal fiscal
35. Letter from Governor Bill Walker, supra note 30.
36. Brad Wright, Anna Porter, Phillip M. Singer & David K. Jones, The Devolution of
Health Reform? A Comparative Analysis of State Innovation Waiver Activity, 44 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 315 (2019) (describing series of state reinsurance reforms following Alaska’s
example).
37. Sixteen states have received section 1332 waivers, in most cases to implement
affordability-promoting high-risk pool reinsurance programs and obtain pass through of the
millions of dollars of associated federal savings. See Tracking Section 1332 State Innovation
Waivers, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Nov. 1, 2020), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/
tracking-section-1332-state-innovation-waivers/ [https://perma.cc/TEY3-U8HT] (describing
waivers in Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and Wisconsin, all of which are reinsurance-type programs with the exception of Hawaii).
38. E.g., ZACHARY W. SHERMAN & MARIE GANIM, OFF. OF THE HEALTH INS. COMM’R, RHODE
ISLAND’S 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION 5 (2019), https://healthsourceri.com/wp-content/uploads/
190708_FinalApplicationPackage.pdf [https://perma.cc/46D5-S2WY]; J.P. WIESKE, OFF. OF THE
COMM’R OF INS., WISCONSIN HEALTHCARE STABILITY PLAN 16 (2018), https://oci.wi.gov/
Documents/AboutOCI/Wisconsin%20Healthcare%20Stability%20Plan%20-%20FINAL%20
public%20pp.pdf [https://perma.cc/H598-XZDA].
39. See Section 1332: State Innovation Waivers, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Section_
1332_State_Innovation_Waivers- [https://perma.cc/B79H-DNUP] (navigate down to “Passthrough Funding Tools and Resources,” and then “2019 Pass-through Funding,” to select “Key
Components of PPACA Section 1332 Tentative Pass-through Payments Reinsurance Waivers,
2019 (XLSX)”) (providing excel spreadsheet with data regarding several states’ reinsurance
waivers).
40. Id.
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flexibility; some of these reforms are problematic from the standpoint of health policy, as discussed in the next Part. This next wave
of reform aspires to use the ACA’s fiscal waiver authority, perhaps
in conjunction with the regulatory waiver authority, to bring about
more sweeping change.
B. Medicaid Costs Not Otherwise Matchable
In “big waiver” through the Medicaid program, too, fiscal waiver
authorities have been very influential. Medicaid is a cooperative
federalism program of health insurance for low-income Americans
that in many ways is the linchpin of the United States health care
system.41 As with ACA waivers, federal funding made available
through the fiscal component of Medicaid’s “big waiver” authority
has been a driving force behind state health reforms in an otherwise stagnant policy environment. The influence and role of fiscal
waiver authorities in Medicaid is obscured, however, in part because of three complicating factors about this hard-to-understand
program.
The first complication, which simply makes Medicaid difficult to
study despite its importance in covering low-income Americans, is
the fact that Medicaid is in some sense fifty different cooperative
federalism programs. As the saying goes, “if you know one Medicaid
program, you know one Medicaid program.”42 The Medicaid statute
sets out a governing federal framework, but states have wide latitude to make changes.43
The second complication is that unlike ACA subsidies, which the
federal government pays in full, the federal government leaves some
Medicaid costs to states to pay themselves. In operation, Medicaid
benefits are technically provided to beneficiaries by states, but the
federal government then pays states 50-83 percent of those costs
(and 90 percent for the “expansion population” added by the ACA),
41. Isaac D. Buck, Managing Medicaid, 11 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 107, 111
n.11 (2017).
42. JEAN HEARNE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33019, MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY FOR ADULTS AND
CHILDREN 27 (2005), http://research.policyarchive.org/2518.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB6Y-3SNQ].
43. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396w-5; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
519, 584-86 (2012) (plurality opinion) (holding mandatory Medicaid expansion unconstitutional and severing offending provision by rendering expansion optional).
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varying up or down based on a statutory formula that considers the
relative financial resources of the state.44 States are responsible only
for their costs remaining after this contribution. Through Medicaid,
the federal government paid $399 billion for medical costs in 2018.45
The third complication is that, again unlike the ACA waiver, the
fiscal waiver authority in Medicaid is not limited by statute to “pass
through” of federal savings, and there is no deficit-related cap. It is
much broader than that. The Medicaid statute’s “big waiver” provision, section 1115, includes both a regulatory component in section
1115(a)(1) (allowing HHS to waive compliance with certain Medicaid
provisions at a state’s request) and a fiscal component in section
1115(a)(2) (allowing HHS to increase federal payments to a state for
the program at the state’s request). Under the fiscal waiver authority the agency may treat as reimbursable expenditures “costs ...
which would not otherwise be included as expenditures” subject to
matching under the statute, as long as they are part of an “experimental, pilot, or demonstration project” that the Secretary judges
“is likely to assist in promoting the objectives” of the Medicaid
statute.46
As written, Medicaid’s fiscal waiver authority would allow HHS
to provide federal matching payments for essentially any state
44. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b, 1396d(b). See generally ALISON MITCHELL, EVELYNE P.
BAUMRUCKER, KIRSTEN J. COLELLO, ANGELA NAPILI & CLIFF BINDER, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R43357, MEDICAID: AN OVERVIEW (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43357.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3DC4-SLAN] (explaining state Medicaid distributions); ALISON MITCHELL & SARA
BENCIC, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10399, OVERVIEW OF THE ACA MEDICAID EXPANSION (2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10399.pdf [https://perma.cc/KC25-RHRG].
45. See infra Table 1.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1315. Some “experiments” have been going on for decades and are not
subject to meaningful evaluation. See Sara Rosenbaum, Maria Velasquez, Rachel Gunsalus,
Rebecca Morris & Alexander Somodevilla, Will Evaluations of Medicaid 1115 Demonstrations
that Restrict Eligibility Tell Policymakers What They Need to Know?, COMMONWEALTH FUND
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2018/dec/evalua
tions-medicaid-1115-restrict-eligibility [https://perma.cc/QJ27-DLYK] (highlighting the lack
of meaningful evaluation regarding an Arkansas experiment). See generally Anthony
Albanese, Essay, The Past, Present, and Future of Section 1115: Learning from History to
Improve the Medicaid-Waiver Regime Today, 128 YALE L.J.F. 827 (2019) (tracing the history
and lack of follow-through on experiments). Recently courts have rejected HHS’s
determinations that certain controversial regulatory waivers were “likely to assist in promoting the objectives” of Medicaid. See Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 99-102 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1315), cert. granted, 2020 WL 7086046 (Dec. 4, 2020) (No. 20-38); Stewart
v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 260 (D.D.C. 2018).
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expenditure that HHS thought would contribute to the health of (or
perhaps improve health coverage for) program beneficiaries.47 HHS
could, for example, wield its fiscal waiver authority to double the
federal government’s Medicaid payments to Rhode Island, authorizing federal matching for unprecedented substance use disorder
treatment coverage and long-term care programs; to fund a comprehensive hospital transportation network for enrollees; or even
perhaps to fund medical-legal partnerships.48 HHS has not opted to
exercise the authority in so expansive a manner, however.
Beginning with the Reagan administration, and as reportedly
insisted on by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the
Executive Office of the President, HHS has voluntarily, as a matter
of administrative discretion, converted section 1115(a)(2) from an
almost unbounded agency power to increase state funding into a
shared federal savings mechanism akin to that in the ACA.49 In a
perfect illustration of the influence of the “tyranny of the budget”
over the development of health policy,50 HHS (through its Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)) has self-imposed a budget
neutrality requirement to constrain its use of its fiscal waiver authority. Under this requirement, the agency will indeed reward a
state with new federal matching funds for previously unmatched
state expenses (or new, ineligible state expenses).51 But the agency
will only do so if the state makes changes, cuts, or investments that
HHS calculates (often using fuzzy math52) will save the federal
47. See Griffin Schoenbaum, Comment, Predetermined? The Prospect of Social Determinant-Based Section 1115 Waivers After Stewart v. Azar, 124 DICK. L. REV. 533, 543-44
(2020).
48. Id. at 543-47.
49. Frank J. Thompson & Courtney Burke, Executive Federalism and Medicaid
Demonstration Waivers: Implications for Policy and Democratic Process, 32 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 971, 974-75 (2007) (“In 1983 ... the OMB insisted that [HHS] adhere to the
principle of budget neutrality in its waiver reviews.”); Judith M. Rosenberg & David T. Zaring,
Managing Medicaid Waivers: Section 1115 and State Health Care Reform, 32 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 545, 548 (1995) (crediting OMB with budget neutrality requirement); Allen Dobson,
Donald Moran & Gary Young, The Role of Federal Waivers in the Health Policy Process, 11
HEALTH AFFS. 72, 85-86 (1992).
50. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing “tyranny of the budget”).
51. “[B]ecause money is fungible, the amount of relief provided is far more important than
the specific subject matter of the intervention.” Super, supra note 1, at 2561.
52. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-312, MEDICAID DEMONSTRATIONS: FEDERAL
ACTION NEEDED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF SPENDING (2017). On abuses in this system, see
generally DANIEL L. HATCHER, THE POVERTY INDUSTRY: THE EXPLOITATION OF AMERICA’S
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government amounts equivalent to the amount of the new federal
expenditures.53
Perhaps due to these complications, Medicaid’s fiscal waiver
authority is poorly understood even within Medicaid circles. For
example, scholarship often describes budget neutrality in Medicaid
incorrectly as required by statute even though it is not.54 But despite
the self-imposed limitations on its use, this authority has quietly
played a key role in the course of health policy in the states for
decades. After President Clinton’s failed national health reform
effort, the Medicaid fiscal waiver authority proved an essential
motivating factor for state reform.55 Indeed, the Massachusetts

MOST VULNERABLE CITIZENS (2016).
53. Letter from Timothy B. Hill, Acting Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to
State Medicaid Dirs., Budget Neutrality Policies for Section 1115(a) Medicaid Demonstration
Projects (Aug. 22, 2018) [hereinafter CMS Budget Neutrality Policy], https://www.medicaid.
gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18009.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9FA-BJQE]
(“Currently, CMS will not approve a demonstration project under section 1115(a) of the Act
unless the project is expected to be budget neutral to the federal government. A budget
neutral demonstration project does not result in Medicaid costs to the federal government that
are greater than what the federal government’s Medicaid costs would likely have been absent
the demonstration.”); Section 1115 Research and Demonstration Waivers, MEDICAID & CHIP
PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N [hereinafter Section 1115 Research and Demonstration Waivers],
https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/section-1115-research-and-demonstration-waivers/
[https://perma.cc/TL4N-V52N] (“Over time, CMS has allowed states to calculate budget
neutrality in multiple ways.... Section 1115 waivers can be used to allow a state to use savings
generated by one initiative to pay for other changes, such as eligibility expansions, as long as
the waiver as a whole is budget neutral. The calculations of budget neutrality can be
controversial.”).
54. Alissa Halperin, Patricia Nemore & Vicki Gottlich, What’s So Special About Medicare
Advantage Special Needs Plans? Assessing Medicare Special Needs Plans for “Dual Eligibles”,
8 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 215, 245 (2007) (“Federal law allows states to seek a waiver ...
while remaining budget neutral.”); Lisa Dubay, Christina Moylan & Thomas R. Oliver,
Advancing Toward Universal Coverage: Are States Able to Take the Lead?, 7 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL’Y 1, 29 (2004) (“This statutory requirement mandates that section 1115 demonstration waivers be budget neutral with respect to the federal government.”); Sarah J.
Donnell, Comment, An Ill-Advised Cure? Providing Medicaid Benefits to the Medicare Population, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1213, 1227 (2004) (“Although the Secretary has broad authority to
waive Medicaid requirements in approving demonstration projects, the Secretary cannot
approve demonstration projects that cost the federal government more money than it would
otherwise have expended if the program did not exist.”).
55. See John Holahan & Len Nichols, State Health Policy in the 1990s, in HEALTH POLICY,
FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES 39, 48-54 (Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds.,
1996) (describing savings to the federal government associated with either adoption of
Medicaid managed care or reduced-benefit packages to have been the causal mechanism
behind more than a dozen state-based reforms to expand or revise Medicaid programs).
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expansion that inspired the ACA was made possible by shared
federal savings awarded through the fiscal authority.56 The enactment of the ACA has not altered that trend; quite the opposite,
the goal of generating savings and so payments under a waiver
continues to be a determinative motivating factor in state-based
health reform efforts.57 By 2015, 33 percent of federal Medicaid
expenditures were spent through this fiscal waiver authority,
accounting for $109 billion in forty states.58
II. AGENCY USE OF FISCAL WAIVERS TO INFLUENCE
STATE POLICY MAKING
This Part theorizes and problematizes fiscal waiver authorities
by abstracting the mechanism’s use in health care along two dimensions, one functional and one normative. First, each Section
isolates from the messy, real world experience of health reform a
distinct way that fiscal waiver authorities influence state policy
making—inspiring states (Section A) and inducing states (Section
B). These functions can be thought of as discrete “ends” to which
HHS can put the “means” of fiscal waiver authorities in health care.
Second, each Section also develops implications of the function it
describes from three normative perspectives: federalism, which
focuses on the role of states;59 substantive policy, which focuses on
56. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalism in Health Care Reform, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY
NET: FEDERALISM AND POVERTY 197, 198 (Ezra Rosser ed., 2019) (“Massachusetts initiated
universal health insurance coverage in 2006 with approval from the Bush Administration to
use Medicaid funding.”); MICHAEL DOONAN, AMERICAN FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE: THE
FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTEMPORARY HEALTH POLICY 99-114 (2013)
(explaining role of federal funding in Massachusetts health reform).
57. New York’s Medicaid Redesign Team plan to reform its health care system under
Governor Cuomo was built around “reinvest[ing] the federal savings generated” by Medicaid
payment changes “back into New York’s healthcare delivery system.” Josine Janus, Financial
Incentives to Change the Healthcare Landscape: A Case Study, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF
HEALTHCARE FINANCING 108, 111 (Wolf Sauter et al. eds., 2019). New York achieved savings
by adding a global spending cap to its Medicaid program, generating $8 billion in “federal
savings.” Id. at 111-12.
58. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 52.
59. This Article focuses on the core federalism value of experimentation. See Schapiro,
supra note 1, at 1532-38 (explaining federalism values); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism,
82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389-404 (1997) (cataloging federalism values including public participation in democracy, experimentation, protecting health and welfare, and protecting
liberty).
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real world outcomes in a given domain such as health,60 including
compliance with statutory goals;61 and administrative law, which
focuses on agency discretion and the separation of powers.62 My goal
in developing such implications is descriptive. I highlight effects of
fiscal waiver authorities that are particularly salient from the
standpoint of key normative approaches.
A. Inspiring
Fiscal waiver authorities have the theoretical potential, explained
in Subsection 1, to restore state innovation incentives otherwise distorted by federal spending. Whereas regulatory waivers free a state
to engage in an experiment that would otherwise be foreclosed by
60. See Lindsay F. Wiley, Applying the Health Justice Framework to Diabetes as a
Community-Managed Social Phenomenon, 16 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 191, 218 (2016) (“I
have described health justice as an emerging framework for eliminating health disparities
and for securing uniquely public interests in access to affordable, high-quality health care.”
(footnote omitted)).
61. Courts and some readers may prefer to evaluate the policy impacts of fiscal waivers
from a statutory perspective rather than a theoretical one. Both the Medicaid statute and the
ACA have providing access to health insurance coverage as a broad purpose. See Gresham v.
Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he principal objective of Medicaid is providing
health care coverage.”), cert. granted, 2020 WL 7086046 (Dec. 4, 2020) (No. 20-38); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396-1 (describing purpose of Medicaid statute as “to furnish ... medical assistance on behalf
of families”); King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 498 (2015) (“Congress passed the Affordable Care
Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them.”); 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (describing
the goal of ACA as to “add millions of new consumers to the health insurance market ... and
... increase the number and share of Americans who are insured”). Most of the normative
concerns raised in this Article surround this core objective and so are the same regardless of
whether one employs a normative perspective, such as health justice, or statutory objectives
in evaluating policy implications. One exception is the discussion of Medicare-for-All in Part
V, which addresses the use of fiscal waivers to fuel investment in health improvement.
62. This Article’s normative approach to administrative law relies on two core values
implicated when agencies rather than Congress make decisions, namely accountability and
avoiding arbitrariness. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 464 (2003) (“[A] focus on the
avoidance of arbitrary agency decisionmaking lies at the core of both a theoretical justification
of administrative legitimacy and a practical evaluation of administrative law doctrines.”);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Democratizing the Administrative State, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 559,
562 (2006) (“Scholars have long questioned the political and constitutional legitimacy of the
administrative state,” and administrative law doctrine has sought to answer such questions.);
Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998)
(describing accountability value); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (describing the roles of accountability and
legitimacy questions in development of administrative law).
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law, fiscal waivers can encourage the state to experiment (or free it
financially to do so). This function is particularly noteworthy because federal spending is often thought to interfere with state
innovation, not inspire it.63 That said, innovation is not always
desirable from a substantive policy perspective and much about the
current use of these authorities tends to inspire disentitlement (to
use Professor Jost’s term),64 as explained in Subsection 2.
1. Theory
a. Intersovereign Spillovers
Fiscal waivers’ capacity to inspire grows out of an underlying
distortion that interferes with state innovation incentives. Where
the federal government takes on some or all responsibility for costs
incurred by (or benefits created by) state residents, it creates an
intersovereign spillover that predictably depresses state innovation
and dilutes political accountability.65 Interstate spillovers are well
known in federalism theory, which predicts that when the state
does not bear the costs or benefits of state activity (whether law,
63. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-91 (1937) (discussing how federal
spending could interfere with state innovation by directing or even coercing state action);
Andrew B. Coan, Commandeering, Coercion, and the Deep Structure of American Federalism,
95 B.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2015) (“[C]onditional spending ... interferes with the ability of states to
respond to the interests and preferences of their constituents.”); Brian Galle, Federal Grants,
State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875 (2008) (describing this focus of coercion doctrine); see also
CONG. BUDGET OFF., FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 12 (2013)
(including the promotion of experimentation as a function of federal grants, but describing
this function as leaving states regulatory “flexibility” to vary their reforms within a federal
superstructure, not as rewarding or incentivizing experimentation). One notable example of
a federal spending program focused on inspiring state and local innovation was the Race to
the Top program, which was intended to encourage public schools to innovate in improving
themselves. See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567,
590-92 (2011) (describing Race to the Top).
64. For a discussion on the nature of entitlements, see TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST,
DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTSBASED RESPONSE 23-51 (2003) (“disentitlement” means limiting the availability and generosity
of an entitlement program by impeding eligibility or access).
65. The above discussion treats states and localities as an “it,” but in fact policy making
is usually divided among a web of individuals and institutions with their own differing
incentives and goals. See Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J.
564, 595-603 (2017) (surveying vertical, horizontal, and internal dimensions of local
administration).
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investment, or otherwise), that state has insufficient reason to
reduce such costs or maximize such benefits.66 Such spillovers
include not only costs and benefits from concrete activities with
cross-border impacts, such as environmental pollution, but also
costs and benefits from more abstract activities that also have crossborder impacts, such as law reform and experimentation.67
Intersovereign spillovers—in which the federal government bears
the costs or benefits associated with a state reform—have been
noted in prior scholarship as a potential problem whenever the
federal government takes on significant responsibility for costs
incurred by (or benefits produced by) states or their residents,
including sovereign bankruptcy,68 welfare,69 and health care.70
66. Economists assume that jurisdictions compete with each other for residents who will
contribute to their tax base, a theory credited to Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 422 (1956). See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein,
Introduction to 1 ECONOMICS OF FEDERALISM (Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein eds.,
2007); cf. Davidson, supra note 65, at 628 (explaining the incentive of states and towns to
avoid the exit of their residents and attract an influx of new residents). On this assumption,
interstate spillovers are a major problem because they leave states with insufficient
incentives to invest in public goods. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and
Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 546 (1997)
(examining this concept in terms of environmental regulation).
67. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594, 603-04 (1980) (identifying the interstate spillover
problem as one barrier to state experimentation and concluding that in light of public choice
considerations, “few useful experiments will be carried out” at state and local level, especially
because states have incentive to “free ride” on others’ innovations); Koleman S. Strumpf, Does
Government Decentralization Increase Policy Innovation?, 4 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 207, 208-10
(2002) (discussing the free-rider problem); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 925 (1994) (“[I]ndividual states will
have no incentive to invest in experiments that involve any substantive or political risk.”);
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484,
1498 & n.58 (1987) (describing the argument that “[a] consolidated national government ...
stifles choice and lacks the goad of competition” and that in a decentralized system “there will
be more innovation ... both because there are more actors and because individual constituencies will perceive risk and reward differently”); see also Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy,
Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J.
1333 (2009) (revisiting Rose-Ackerman’s thesis and finding insufficient state investment in
experimentation).
68. Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 287 (2012) (noting the downside of federal intervention
in municipal bankruptcy is that expectation of a federal backstop “induces localities to incur
more and riskier debts than would otherwise be the case, hence increasing the likelihood [of]
fiscal distress[] and the need for centralized intervention”).
69. DAVID A. SUPER, PUBLIC WELFARE LAW 781 (2017) (“[M]oral hazard is ... an extremely
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Similar to interstate spillovers, such spillovers tend to depress state
innovation and investment, because reforms that are worthwhile
overall may not be worthwhile—or affordable—to the state with the
cost or benefit that spills over to the federal government subtracted.
b. Fiscal Waiver Authorities as a Pigouvian Subsidy and
Innovation Incentive
Economic thinking offers a simple theoretical solution to the intersovereign spillover problem: provide the state an offsetting subsidy or liability equal to the amount of the spillover. This method of
correcting spillovers is known in economics as a Pigouvian subsidy
(or Pigouvian tax).71 A Pigouvian subsidy could be used to cure
intersovereign spillovers by sharing with a state the benefit to the
federal government of state investments that create savings for the
federal government due to the federal government’s fiscal responsibility for state residents’ education, health care, employment, and
so on.72
According to this economic thinking, then, it makes some sense
that HHS uses fiscal waiver authorities to share federal savings.
Doing so tends to restore state innovation incentives otherwise
depressed by the intersovereign spillover associated with federal
responsibility for state residents’ health care costs.

important policy issue in public welfare law.”).
70. Abigail R. Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in
Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844 (2009) [hereinafter Moncrieff,
Federalization Snowballs]; Abigail R. Moncrieff, A Closer Look at the Federalization Snowball,
109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 73, 77 (2009) (predicting that the federal government’s
significant share of responsibility for health care costs depresses medical malpractice reform
because states bear the full costs of investment but share the benefits with the federal government). Moncrieff’s insight is a launching-off point for this discussion. Moncrieff referred to
such spillovers as “snowballs” based on her conclusion that when present, intersovereign
spillovers force total federalization because sharing federal savings is practically impossible.
Id.
71. See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 66-67 (William J. Baumol ed., 1972)
(describing A.C. Pigou’s proposed subsidy to counteract positive externalities); Wallace E.
Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, 1127 (1999) (describing
the theoretical potential of Pigouvian subsidies to correct interstate spillovers).
72. See OATES, supra note 71, at 66 (“[I]n the case of external benefits, the economic unit
generating the spillover should receive a unit subsidy equal to the value at the margin of the
spillover benefits it creates.”).
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Moreover, federal dollars offered to states through fiscal waivers
can be understood to inspire even if we relax the assumptions of
economic theory. Experimentalist scholars have called for the
federal government to take an active role in stimulating state and
local experimentation as part of a recursive process of continual
adaptation, evaluation, and improvement.73 Rewarding novel or
productive state programs with fiscal waiver dollars can do just this,
acting as an innovation incentive that is strikingly similar to the
federal role Dorf and Sabel initially called for in advocating
democratic experimentalism.74
This reward may be particularly pivotal in stimulating state
investment because states are highly liquidity-constrained and so
may be unable to make even worthwhile investments that require
expenditures upfront.75 (This liquidity constraint also offers one

73. See Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, 52 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 1137-45 (2018) (describing considerations that influence the choice of
forum—Congress, agency, state, county, and so on—in which to stimulate policy
experimentation); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism
in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 55 (2011) (“In experimentalist regimes, central
institutions.... monitor[ ] local performance, pool[ ] information in disciplined comparisons, and
create[ ] pressures and opportunities for continuous improvement at all levels.”).
74. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 340, 345 (1998) (“The task of the legislature is to authorize ...
deliberations and finance the ensuing experiments where local resources are insufficient to
do so.... The agencies are thus the continuing organized link between the national and the
local, helping to create through national action the local conditions for experimentation, and
changing national arrangements accordingly.”). As David Super pointed out in Laboratories
of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 541 (2008), Dorf and Sabel were imprecise about how the federal government would
calculate its fiscal transfers or set guardrails for those transfers, concluding only “Congress
can authorize the provision of funds to administrative agencies or to local governments to be
distributed in turn to groups (of citizen users, local governments, and providers) able to
present promising plans for continuing collaboration (including long-term consultation with
others).” Dorf & Sabel, supra, at 343. This Article’s example and analysis of HHS’s use of
fiscal waiver authorities to share federal savings can be understood as elaborating on some
of the questions left open by Dorf and Sabel. It also illustrates Super’s broader concern that
not all experimentation is good experimentation, or real experimentation.
75. See Michael S. Sparer & Lawrence D. Brown, States and the Health Care Crisis: The
Limits and Lessons of Laboratory Federalism, in HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE
AMERICAN STATES, supra note 55, at 181, 185 (arguing that a first barrier to state-based
health investment is “money” because “finding dollars for reform is difficult”); Super, supra
note 1, at 2629 (discussing constitutional and fiscal constraints on state budgets that require
balanced budgets and limit ability to raise revenue through bonds or other forms of
borrowing).
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reason to doubt the simple economic prediction that federal
spending depresses state innovation—because federal spending may
free up state resources that can be directed toward innovation
elsewhere.) If, for example, a state invests in housing for individuals
in recovery from substance use disorder and thereby reduces relapse
rates, its investment will reduce Medicaid costs and Medicare
hospitalization costs while increasing federal and state tax revenues.76 But states do not have the luxury of considering all those
savings in deciding whether they can afford the reform; they must
balance their budget within existing, narrow budgetary categories.
Promising the state the federal savings associated with such a
reform can stimulate investment that the state might have wanted
to make otherwise, but could not afford.
2. Practice
Despite the theoretical promise of sharing with states federal
savings associated with state reforms as a way to inspire state
innovation, legal scholarship has not delved into this possibility.
Although two scholars have explicitly acknowledged the possibility
of rewarding a state for the external benefits of state investments,
these scholars have thought of the idea as a practical nonstarter,
and so have not explored the possibility or its broader implications.77
The experience of fiscal waivers in health care demonstrates that
while these scholars correctly predicted that estimating the savings
to the federal government flowing from a state reform is very hard
to do accurately, that does not mean that sharing federal savings
cannot be done. A key reason that sharing federal savings is
76. Compare Anthony T. Lo Sasso, Erik Byro, Leonard A. Jason, Joseph R. Ferrari &
Bradley Olson, Benefits and Costs Associated with Mutual-Help Community-Based Recovery
Homes: The Oxford House Model, 35 EVALUATION & PROGRAM PLAN. 47 (2012) (estimating
significant per person savings from a particular recovery home model as compared to standard
treatment), with infra Table 1 (explaining the federal government’s share in medical costs).
77. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1431 n.20 (2011) (addressing the possibility of rewarding states in the
specific context of state incentives to develop, test, and report on innovative policies, but finding a reward system “would seem to face formidable practical difficulties”); Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs, supra note 70, at 879, 886 (raising and rejecting possibility of a grant-based
solution in medical malpractice, noting, “there is a prohibitive practical problem with block
grants: [t]he real dollar level of the grant would be nearly impossible to determine”).
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possible despite the challenge of accurate prediction is that a
subsidy need not accurately predict the future in order to impact a
state’s innovation incentives. Actuaries can and do readily estimate
costs or benefits associated with state changes; indeed, doing so is
essential in pricing insurance and scoring legislation.78 As long as
the subsidy aligns with the state’s predictions about the cost or
benefit of a state reform, it will tend to mitigate or eliminate the
effect of the spillover on state incentives, even if there is uncertainty about the estimate.79
ACA waivers also illustrate that an important obstacle noted by
Professor Stephenson—that of precommitment80—is not insurmountable but simply depends on the funding mechanism that
backs up the commitment of increased federal dollars. The ACA
funded premium tax credits through a permanent, indefinite
appropriation.81 This has proven important, as it has permitted the
government to honor its commitments in the waiver terms and
conditions to make fiscal waiver payments to states from that appropriation and has permitted states to rely on such commitments
even as appropriations for other ACA programs have proven
problematic.82
Fiscal waivers’ inspiration function is a positive from the standpoint of federalism values, as experimentation is a core such value.83
Fiscal waivers therefore represent an additional means by which
78. See, e.g., Marshall Allen, Why Health Insurers Track When You Buy Plus-Size Clothes
or Binge-Watch TV, PBS NEWSHOUR (July 17, 2018, 10:18 AM), https://www.pbs.org/news
hour/health/why-health-insurers-track-when-you-buy-plus-size-clothes-or-binge-watch-tv
[https://perma.cc/FBC3-YRBZ] (explaining that insurers collect information on insureds to
make “predictions about how much your health care could cost them”); OFF. OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-11, PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND
EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET (2006), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/
circulars/a11/current_year/a_11_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XB9-XBGP] (describing
predictions in scoring legislation and developing baselines).
79. See CMS Budget Neutrality Policy, supra note 53, at 3-4 (describing actuarial
calculation of savings by comparing hypothetical “With Waiver” costs to “Without Waiver”
costs). Uncertainty surrounding a prediction may tend to dilute, but not eliminate, the
innovation incentive associated with shared federal savings, though assessing the degree to
which this is the case requires further study.
80. See Stephenson, supra note 77, at 1432-33.
81. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401(d)(1), 31 U.S.C. § 1324.
82. See generally Matthew B. Lawrence, The Social Consequences Problem in Health
Insurance and How to Solve It, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 593 (2019).
83. See supra note 59 (describing federalism values).
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the federal government can spur state innovation.84 However, Gluck
and Huberfeld have argued forcefully—and in the author’s view,
persuasively—that the desirability of federalism arrangements
cannot be evaluated purely in the abstract, without reference to
underlying policy goals.85 In short, from the standpoint of a substantive field like health policy, our federalism is a means that
cannot be evaluated without reference to our ends.
From the standpoint of leading normative perspectives on health
and welfare policy, including the goals underlying the ACA and the
Medicaid statute,86 the innovation that fiscal waivers inspire can be
valuable indeed. The Massachusetts universal coverage plan on
which the ACA was based is certainly the most momentous example
of a successful experiment made possible by a fiscal waiver.87
Alaska’s reinsurance waiver is a clear recent example. Although
states showed a surprising lack of interest in running their own
ACA marketplaces even during the Obama administration,88 and
the Trump administration took steps that were inconsistent with
the law’s approach to health reform,89 Alaska proposed and the
Trump administration approved the reinsurance waiver. Alaska’s
approach has now proven successful, furthering the access and cost
goals of health policy while inspiring fifteen additional states to
adopt analogous reforms.90
That said, HHS’s current approach to fiscal waivers also demonstrates the wisdom of Gluck and Huberfeld’s insight that inspiration
for inspiration’s sake is not necessarily a good thing. Recent HHS
guidance documents lay out the agency’s approach.91 That approach
84. Cf. Madison, supra note 7.
85. See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 7, at 1802 (“The ACA’s architecture challenges
whether any ... goals and values are unique to federalism .... It illustrates how federalism is
a proxy for many ideas and challenges us to ask what we are really fighting over.”).
86. See supra notes 60-61 (describing health justice approach to health policy as well as
statutory goals of Medicaid statute and ACA).
87. See DOONAN, supra note 56, at 99-114.
88. Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 7, at 1759-66.
89. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355, 373 (5th Cir. 2019) (highlighting the
DOJ’s decision not to defend the constitutionality of the ACA).
90. See Wright et al., supra note 36; Katie Keith, CMS Announces 2019 Pass-Through
Funding for State Waivers, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
do/10.1377/hblog20181210.621103/full/ [https://perma.cc/FX4W-4N6V] (describing waivers);
supra Part I.A (describing states that have followed Alaska’s waiver).
91. CMS Budget Neutrality Policy, supra note 53.
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artificially circumscribes savings calculations in four ways that
individually and collectively reward states for saving the federal
government by cutting benefits and eligibility (for disentitlement)92
but not for saving the federal government by investing in their
residents’ health or their health care systems.93 The agency’s
contemporary approach is thus problematic in similar ways to block
grants (which simply transfer all federal funds to states in a lump
sum) in programs, such as the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families program, which ultimately facilitated massive disentitlement in many states.94
First, savings are limited narrowly to particular federal programs—for ACA waivers to savings through federal ACA subsidies,
and for Medicaid waivers to savings through federal Medicaid
expenditures.95 Savings created by a state reform through lower
federal spending in other programs, such as Medicare, do not count,
and neither do increased federal tax revenues or changes in tax
subsidies.96 Second, the agency limits its calculation of savings to a
92. JOST, supra note 64 (discussing the nature of entitlements).
93. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 483 (2011)
(noting, in 2011, “most states ... use waivers to cut costs by cutting benefits”).
94. E.g., Hammond, supra note 12 (describing the erosion of the Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families block grant program); see also Michael S. Greve, Essay, Bloc Party
Federalism, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279, 298 (2019) (“In 2017, Congress considered ... a
Medicaid ‘block grant’ reform.”). On prior reforms block granting significant health and
welfare programs, see generally Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the
Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552 (1999);
Super, supra note 74.
95. ACA waiver pass through is limited by the statute to ACA subsidy amounts. See 42
U.S.C. § 18052(a)(3). Medicaid savings are not so limited by statute, see id. § 1315(a)(2), but
the agency’s guidance and concepts choose to impose such a limitation. See Letter from Calder
Lynch, Dir., Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. to State Medical Dirs. 18 (Jan. 30. 2020)
[hereinafter Letter to State Medicaid Dirs.], https://www.medicaid.gov/sites/default/files/
Federal-Policy-Guidance/Downloads/smd20001.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EVP-RB23] (limiting
to “savings [from] spending less on Medicaid expenditures”); CMS Budget Neutrality Policy,
supra note 53, at 3-5 (explaining the formula that takes into account only changes in Medicaid
spending). For a discussion of related restrictions in prior administrations’ approach to calculating shared federal savings in Medicaid, see KAISER FAM. FOUND., THE ROLE OF SECTION
1115 WAIVERS IN MEDICAID AND CHIP: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD (2009),
https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/7874.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DM8-3FXH].
96. See State Relief and Empowerment Waivers, 83 Fed. Reg. 53,575, 53,580 (Oct. 24,
2018) (“The amount of federal pass-through funding equals the Secretaries’ annual estimate
of the federal financial assistance, including PTC, small business tax credits, or cost-sharing
reductions, provided pursuant to the PPACA that would have been paid ... in the absence of
the waiver.”).
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five-year window, refusing to consider federal savings that accrue
over the long term.97 Third, the incentive mechanism shares savings
annually only as they accrue, which leaves cash-strapped states
unable to adopt reforms that require front-loaded investments.98
Fourth, states are liable if the federal government’s costs unexpectedly go up rather than down as a result of the state investment,99
discouraging states from making risky but worthwhile bets—unless
they rely on a private contractor to administer the investment.100
Individually and collectively, these limitations bias state innovation toward disentitlement and privatization, and away from
investment in improving residents’ health or health care. Disentitlement requires little up-front investment and brings reliable shortterm, program-specific savings, which are fully rewarded by the
current cramped approach to calculating savings. Such changes
include adding cost-sharing (which reduces utilization), privatizing
to a managed-care approach (which brings tighter utilization review
that further reduces utilization, and so cost), and adding paperwork
or other impediments to program participation.101 The savings
associated with such cuts are immediate and derived entirely within
the program.

97. CMS Budget Neutrality Policy, supra note 53, at 8; cf. Sara Rosenbaum & Benjamin
D. Sommers, Rethinking Medicaid in the New Normal, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
127, 147 n.94 (2011) (“OMB has used longer term windows in the past in approving Medicaid
section 1115 demonstrations.”).
98. Letter to State Medicaid Dirs., supra note 95, at 20 (agency anticipates approving
reward payments “during the state’s the next demonstration year”); CMS Budget Neutrality
Policy, supra note 53, at 1-4 (shared savings through enhanced expenditure authorities
awarded only in a year for which savings are expected to accrue).
99. CMS Budget Neutrality Policy, supra note 53, at 3 (“[T]he state is at risk ... for
increases to the [per member per month] cost growth.”).
100. Many states have chosen to privatize their Medicaid programs, which frees them of
this uncertainty. See John V. Jacobi, The Tools at Hand: Medicaid Payment Reform for People
with Complex Medical Needs, 28 ANNALS HEALTH L. & LIFE SCIS. 135, 154 (2019). The
desirability or undesirability of privatization is hotly debated by scholars, making the consequence of the current approach to fiscal waivers in health care fraught. Compare JON D.
MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(2017) (providing an overarching critique of privatization), with Alexander Volokh, Prison
Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 779 (2012) (exploring the potential of a form of privatization in
prisons: a prison voucher system).
101. See, e.g., Andy Schneider, Weaponizing Medicaid Paperwork, GEORGETOWN UNIV.
HEALTH POL’Y INST. (Jan. 23, 2018), https://ccf.georgetown.edu/2018/01/23/weaponizing-medic
aid-paperwork/ [https://perma.cc/DW76-K7V9].
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Meanwhile, savings associated with improvements in the quality
of health care or residents’ health require upfront expenditures,
accrue across numerous fiscal categories touched by patients, may
take several years to accrue, and may carry some downside risk—all
features the current approach either ignores or penalizes. For
example, studies have repeatedly shown a huge average return on
investment across multiple programmatic domains in vaccination,
communicable disease prevention, and other public health initiatives, but that return takes more than five years to accrue.102 So too
with sustained investments in the social determinants of health,
such as workforce or housing development.103
Even relatively modest, targeted reforms carry cross-program
benefits and so are left out. A state that made badly needed investments in preventive care for the near-elderly would gain no savings
because the benefits of spending on preventive care for a sixty- to
sixty-four-year-old are largely borne not by Medicaid (or another
payer) but by Medicare, which picks up nearly total responsibility
for medical costs at age sixty-five but is ignored in the administration’s savings calculations.104 Similarly, a state that made desperately needed investments in long-term care would be left out, even
insofar as state investment might save the federal government the
six months of rehabilitation care that is the extent of Medicare’s
long-term care benefit, because of the limitation to in-program savings under the agency’s current fiscal waiver practice.105
102. See Rebecca Masters, Elspeth Anwar, Brendan Collins, Richard Cookson & Simon
Capewell, Return on Investment of Public Health Interventions: A Systematic Review, 71 J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. HEALTH 827 (2017) (surveying literature and finding median ROI of
14.3:1 but noting that benefits are usually observed over a 10-20 year time horizon, not 3-5
years).
103. E.g., Wiley, supra note 7, at 879 (noting that “Vermont officials initially anticipated
that federal funds would be available [for their single-payer effort] from an ACA Section 1332
waiver pass-through” and that limitations on such funding were influential in failure of
proposal).
104. Such reforms with cross-program benefits are not difficult to identify. E.g., Kenneth
E. Thorpe, Estimated Federal Savings Associated with Care Coordination Models for Medicare-Medicaid Dual Eligibles 2 (2011), https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2011/09/
dual-eligible-study-september-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2MN-RJ3Q] (“Well managed team
based care results in lower rates of emergency room, clinic and hospital days—services financed largely by Medicare and not Medicaid, so States are not rewarded for more efficient
use of these services.”).
105. See Allison K. Hoffman, Reimagining the Risk of Long-Term Care, 16 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 147, 170 (2016) (describing gaps left “in home- and community-based long-
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B. Steering
1. Theory
A second function of fiscal waiver authorities is to steer states
to adopt federally selected reforms and not federally disfavored
ones. Unlike regulatory waiver authorities, which primarily impact which policies that differ from the legislative default states
may nonetheless adopt, fiscal waiver authorities primarily influence which actions from the broad range of permissible state actions states choose to pursue, by changing the monetary calculus.
When federal payments are available for any state reform that
saves the federal government money, the result is to restore state
innovation incentives as described in the last section. But when
the agency makes federal funds available only for particular reforms or subsets of reforms that it selects, the result is more compliance than innovation.
To use a metaphor, regulatory authorities shape which reforms
are “on the menu” for states to choose and which are not. But fiscal
authorities set the “price” the state can expect to pay (or be paid) if
it pursues particular reforms. And states’ fiscal constraints push
them to be highly cost-conscious in choosing which reforms to
pursue.106
The potential for federal spending to steer state policy making
is not unique to fiscal waiver authorities. Scholars have previously
noted this steering function in evaluating other forms of federal
spending such as ordinary grant programs.107 And, of course, a longstanding body of legislative coercion doctrine limits the ability of
Congress to influence state action by imposing conditions on
spending.108

term care” programs in order to satisfy budget neutrality).
106. John Kincaid, The Constitutional Frameworks of State and Local Government Finance,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 45, 64-68, 74-77
(Robert D. Ebel & John E. Petersen eds., 2012) (describing financial constraints on states).
107. Super, supra note 1, at 2577-79 (describing the role of federal funding in leading
states); Eloise Pasachoff, Agency Enforcement of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense of the
Funding Cut-Off, 124 YALE L.J. 248, 270-71 (2014).
108. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
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2. Practice
HHS has for decades steered state reform by inviting states to
apply for fiscal waiver funding for agency-favored reforms, and by
setting out conditions waivers must satisfy, beyond those in the
statute, to garner approval.109 Indeed, even the requirement that
waivers be budget neutral to the federal government is an agencycreated condition on approval.110 And as a controversial particular
example, the Obama administration was in one case sued by the
State of Florida for allegedly conditioning renewal of the state’s
high-dollar fiscal waiver on the state’s agreement to expand
Medicaid through telephone hints and a cryptic letter.111
Fiscal waiver authorities’ steering function was an emphasis of
the Trump administration’s health care agenda. In traditional
grant programs, the question of which state reforms to direct
through grant awards is largely decided in advance by Congress;
agencies may then make grant awards subject to elaborate, congressionally specified procedures designed to prevent arbitrariness or abuse to ensure that grants are used to encourage adoption
of the reforms that Congress decided to favor.112 That is not the case
for the fiscal waiver authorities discussed here, which leave the
109. Thompson & Burke, supra note 49, at 977, 987 (“The [George W.] Bush administration
held strong views on how to improve Medicaid .... The administration invited states to submit
waivers targeted toward these ends” and “articulated 1115 waiver themes that it would
welcome,” such as providing health insurance for the uninsured and covering pharmaceuticals.); Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 228-30 (describing historical use of waivers); see also
John Dinan, Implementing Health Reform: Intergovernmental Bargaining and the Affordable
Care Act, 44 PUBLIUS 399, 418 (2014) (describing the influence of federal regulators over
states in health care); Frohnen, supra note 7 (expressing rule of law concern about power
agency officials exert over states through health care waivers).
110. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
111. See Plaintiffs-Petitioners’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction or, in the Alternative, Petition for a Writ of Mandamus at 1, 11-12, Scott v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 3:15-cv-00193-RS-CJK (N.D. Fla. May 7, 2015), ECF No.
15-1 [hereinafter Pls.’ Memo, Scott v. HHS]; Declaration of Justin M. Senior, Scott, No. 3:15cv-00193-RS-CJK (May 7, 2015), ECF Nos. 15-2, 15-3 [hereinafter Senior Decl., Scott v. HHS];
see also Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, Scott, No. 3:15-cv-00193-RS-CJK (June 1, 2015), ECF Nos. 30 to 30-11 [hereinafter
Defs.’ Memo, Scott v. HHS].
112. Such programs certainly present opportunities for agency discretion, especially
surrounding whether and how to sanction states that fail to comply with grant requirements.
Pasachoff, supra note 107.
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agency apparently broad discretion to choose which reforms to favor
with an award of federal dollars.113
The Trump administration invited states to adopt specific reforms
that further its market-focused reform agenda (a substantively good
thing for supporters of that agenda, a substantively bad thing for
opponents). Specifically, HHS has released guidance documents
announcing waiver concepts through which it indicates its willingness to fast-track waiver approval and funding for particular insurance market reforms.114 These reforms include recalibrated
subsidies based on age rather than income,115 relaxed insurance
protections that allow greater discrimination against those with preexisting conditions,116 and increased cost sharing coupled with
health savings accounts.117 Similarly, in Medicaid, HHS has taken
the same approach, announcing in a 2018 “Dear Medicaid Director”
letter a new “policy” to favor “community engagement” (also known
as work requirements) in state waivers.118 More recently, the agency
in January 2020 invited states to adopt “aggregate caps,” which cap
the potential federal expenditure, creating an incentive structure
113. See Social Security Act § 1115(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(2); Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act § 1332(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(3). For a discussion of the precise
bounds of this discretion, see infra Part IV.
114. See State Relief and Empowerment Waivers, 83 Fed. Reg. 53,575 (Oct. 24, 2018);
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SECTION 1332 STATE RELIEF AND EMPOWERMENT
WAIVER CONCEPTS (2018) [hereinafter CMS WAIVER CONCEPTS], https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/
Programs-and-Initiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/Waiver-Concepts-Guidance.
PDF [https://perma.cc/Q67C-XLY8]; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., TAKING ACTION
USING SECTION 1332 WAIVERS (2019), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/
State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/Take-Action-Using-1332-Waivers.pdf [https://perma.
cc/373Q-H89T] (“If a state’s waiver is approved and results in savings to the federal government for PTC or small business tax credits, the state can receive those savings (passthrough funding).”); see also Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Fact Sheet:
State Empowerment and Relief Waiver Concepts (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/
Programs-and-Initiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/Waiver-Concepts-Fact-Sheet.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7SXY-V4NM].
115. CMS WAIVER CONCEPTS, supra note 114, at 8.
116. Id. at 13 (noting that “states would have the flexibility to provide state financial
assistance” for insurance plans that do not qualify as qualified health plans because they do
not satisfy ACA consumer protections).
117. Id. at 20 (“[T]he consumer’s overall cost for premiums and out of pocket [expenses]
would increase.”).
118. Letter from Brian Neale, Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid
Dirs. 1 (Jan. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/FY5Z-YHU4 (“CMS will support state efforts to test
incentives that make participation in work or other community engagement a requirement
for continued Medicaid eligibility.”).
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analogous to block grants,119 as part of “Healthy Adult Opportunity”
reforms, which states have begun to do.120 To facilitate state adoption of the federal proposals, HHS has issued checklists and an FAQ
focused specifically on the state reforms it proposes to reward with
fiscal waiver flexibilities.121
Crucially, focusing on the specific reforms that HHS has invited
misses a huge part of the story. It misses the state reforms never
tried because of states’ expectation that a fiscal waiver award would
not be forthcoming from HHS, which might be thought of as null
waivers.
Most prominently, HHS has indicated its lack of interest in waivers associated with “single-payer” state reforms.122 Opponents of an
expanded government role in health insurance have cited that lack
of interest in advocating against state-based reforms that would if
successful rely on a waiver,123 and they are right that federal
119. Letter to State Medicaid Dirs., supra note 95, at 1-3.
120. The agency has trumpeted the Healthy Adult Opportunity initiative, which explicitly
makes states “eligible to access shared savings,” id. at 2, as “[t]ransformative,” Trump
Administration Announces Transformative Medicaid Healthy Adult Opportunity, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/trump-administration-announces-transformative-medicaid-healthy-adult-opportunity
[https://perma.cc/5TKP-9ASW]; Section 1115 Research and Demonstration Waivers, supra note
53; see also Edward Alan Miller, Nicole Huberfeld & David K. Jones, Pursuing Medicaid Block
Grants with the Healthy Adult Opportunity Initiative: Dressing Up Old Ideas in New Clothes
16-17, J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript on file with author)
(describing Oklahoma and Tennessee efforts to adopt healthy adult opportunity reforms).
121. See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CHECKLIST FOR SECTION 1332
STATE INNOVATION WAIVER APPLICATIONS (2019), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-andInitiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/Checklist-for-Section-1332-State-InnovationWaiver-Applications-5517-c.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TUT-2C3H]; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID SERVS., SECTION 1332 STATE RELIEF AND EMPOWERMENT WAIVER PASS THROUGH
FUNDING FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQ) (2019), https://www.cms.gov/files/document/
section1332-pass-through-funding-faq.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V28-GL8X] (“[T]he savings are
paid from the federal government to the state.”).
122. See Virgil Dickson, Verma Will Reject Any Single-Payer State Waivers, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (July 25, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180725/
NEWS/180729942/verma-will-reject-any-single-payer-state-waivers [https://perma.cc/359NBL2W] (quoting CMS Administrator Verma as stating that “[i]t doesn’t make sense to waste
time on something that’s not going to work” and indicating that “CMS would likely deny
waivers to launch single payment systems”); Nathaniel Weixel, Top Trump Health Official
Slams ‘Medicare for All,’ THE HILL (Jul. 25, 2018, 5:11 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/health
care/398871-top-trump-health-official-slams-medicare-for-all [https://perma.cc/PQ4V-KJ4C].
123. See Press Release, New York Health Plan Association, Memorandum in Opposition
(Feb. 27, 2019), https://realitiesofsinglepayer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HPA-MIO-
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resistance effectively precludes state innovation along these lines.124
Administrator Verma also spoke out against public option proposals.125 And as another example, Massachusetts’s recent effort to
redesign its health care system to bring down drug prices was
foreclosed by HHS’s rejection of its waiver application.126
We can only speculate what health-improving state innovations
might have been pioneered in the past if HHS approved all waiver
requests it believed met the statutory criteria. The Massachusetts
health reform expansion on which the ACA was based was approved
by the Republican Bush administration—what reforms in recent
years might have been? Rejections of waiver applications that states
have taken the time and effort to submit presumably represent a
small fraction of potential state reforms stifled by HHS’s practice of
denying statutorily eligible requests that its leadership does not
support as a policy matter.
HHS’s use of fiscal waivers’ steering function raises concerns from
all three normative perspectives addressed here: federalism, health
policy, and administrative law. Incentivizing states to adopt agencyselected reforms, and discouraging adoption of agency-disfavored
reforms, raises the same concerns of political accountability and
sovereignty underlying the legislative coercion doctrine, albeit not
to the same extreme.127 Moreover, this use of fiscal waiver authorities also raises federalism concerns insofar as it risks connecting
states’ ability to obtain federal financial support for state reforms
A5248-NY-Health-Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/SD3M-Q8T8] (citing Verma’s statement as reason
New York should not attempt to pursue state-based single payer).
124. See Wiley, supra note 7, at 876 (“The starting point for single-payer financing at the
state level is to repurpose ... federal funds already committed to covering the state’s
residents.”). Wiley analyzed the potential for state-based single-payer financing and revealed
repeatedly how the availability of federal funding through fiscal waiver authorities constrains
such efforts.
125. See Paige Minemyer, Verma: Public Option Like ‘Sending Your Referees to Compete
in the Game,’ FIERCE HEALTHCARE (Oct. 27, 2019, 11:36 PM), https://www.fiercehealthcare.
com/payer/verma-bashes-public-option-says-it-s-like-sending-your-referees-to-compete-game
[https://perma.cc/75DR-2MAQ].
126. Letter from Tim Hill, Acting Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Daniel
Tsai, Assistant Sec’y, MassHealth (June 27, 2018), https://www.mass.gov/doc/1115-mass
health-demonstration-amendment-approval-letter-6-27-18-0/download [https://perma.cc/
7HTY-R7MR] (denying Massachusetts’s effort to develop a drug formulary for its Medicaid
program).
127. See infra note 192 (describing the line between inspiration and coercion).
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with political alignment, thereby both exacerbating the fiscal inequity between states lamented by Schapiro,128 and creating a tool
for partisan weaponization.129
As for health policy, HHS’s recent approach shows how fiscal
waivers’ steering function can be problematic. The administration
has used this function to solicit state reforms likely to cut benefits
or eligibility (such as its waiver concepts) while simultaneously
stifling major state reforms designed to improve quality or resident
health that would at least offer valuable lessons for future reform
(such as state single payer or public option reforms).
Finally, HHS’s recent utilization of fiscal waiver authorities’
steering function is also concerning from the standpoint of administrative law. A fundamental challenge of administrative law is how
to legitimate the exercise of power over significant national policies
by unelected bureaucrats. The procedures of the APA, including
notice-and-comment rulemaking, provide an essential curb on
arbitrariness and source of public participation.130 But by threatening to deny waivers, setting implicit or explicit conditions on waiver
approvals, or promising to favor certain waivers, HHS is able to
steer national health policy without providing any such process
(other than the limited process surrounding the ultimate waivers
denials that enforce these efforts, if they become necessary).131
Yes, once a state chooses to pursue a reform the ultimate approval of the state’s waiver and associated financial award is subject
to a rulemaking-like process.132 But by then, the really important
policy decision—about which waivers to encourage by promising
128. Schapiro, supra note 1. On the problem of unequal fiscal treatment of states generally,
see Paul Bernd Spahn, Equity and Efficiency Aspects of Interagency Transfers in a
Multigovernment Framework, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFERS 75, 76-77 (Robin
Boadway & Anwar Shah eds., 2007) (describing the equalization of transfers to regional
governments in various countries and considerations underlying equalization).
129. See Greve, supra note 94, at 279-80, 287 (describing the risk of partisanship in agency
exercises of authority over states); Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126
YALE L.J. 636 (2017) (noting the risk that local experiments will be tailored to support
partisan narratives rather than discover genuinely better policies).
130. See supra note 62 (collecting sources regarding normative considerations in
administrative law).
131. See Frohnen, supra note 7, at 61-64 (expressing rule-of-law concerns about the power
agency officials exert over states through health care waivers).
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(d) (requiring notice and comment for waiver approvals); 42
C.F.R. §§ 431.400-.428 (2019) (implementing statutory notice-and-comment requirements).
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federal dollars and which to stifle by signaling denial— has already
been made. The public might comment upon, and courts might
scrutinize, the reforms that states, prompted by the promise of
federal dollars, choose to pursue, if the agency grants them. But
there is no such opportunity for participation or review in the
agency’s decision to encourage those reforms in the first place, or to
discourage others.
III. BIG MONEY INCREASES THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF
BIG WAIVER
What should we make of the contemporary influence of fiscal
waivers on state policy making in health care? Or to make the
question concrete, suppose you are a federal judge asked by a state
or resident to review an agency’s decision to deny an agency’s fiscal
waiver request, as occurred in Scott v. HHS.133 What legal questions
do such decisions raise and how should those questions be resolved?
Or suppose you are counsel to a senator writing new health reform
legislation or legislation in another area with significant federal
spending.134 Should you include a fiscal waiver authority empowering an agency to alter payments to states like that in the ACA or
Medicaid?
Section A briefly canvases benefits and risks of waiver authorities developed in prior scholarship. The remainder of the Part then
133. See Pls.’ Memo, Scott v. HHS, supra note 111; Defs.’ Memo, Scott v. HHS, supra note
111.
134. In 2019 the federal government spent $4.45 trillion, an amount equal to about 21
percent of gross domestic product. See Your Guide to America’s Finances: How Much Money
Did the Federal Government Collect and Spend in 2019?, DATALAB, https://datalab.usaspend
ing.gov/americas-finance-guide/ [https://perma.cc/TDK4-CEU3] (to view data in terms of U.S.
gross domestic product, click “Learn more about Federal Spending” and then click “U.S.
Economy” on the resulting page). States and localities in the United States spent approximately $3.1 trillion combined in 2017. State and Local Expenditures, URBAN INST., https://
www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/stateand-local-back grounders/state-and-local-expenditures [https://perma.cc/SXZ2-7HAA]. With
the arguable exception of national security, which made up 11 percent of federal spending in
2020, it is difficult to identify something the federal government spends money on over which
states and localities do not exert significant or even primary influence. See Your Guide to
America’s Finances, supra (click “Learn more about Federal Spending” and then click the
“Spending Categories” tab); see also supra notes 68-70 (collecting scholarship discussing
intersovereign spillovers in municipal bankruptcy, welfare, and health care).
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explains how fiscal waiver authorities add to the benefits of big
waiver, but also add to the risks. Section B isolates and elaborates
on a previously unexplored substantive benefit of fiscal waivers that
weighs in their favor—namely, they overcome the “tyranny of the
budget.” Section C isolates and elaborates on a previously underexplored risk exacerbated by fiscal waivers, namely, agency use of
waiver denials (as opposed to approvals) to discourage substantively
beneficial reforms, aggrandize executive power, and stifle experimentation. Parts IV and V then turn to the concrete questions of the
legality of waiver conditions and the design of any fiscal waiver
authority in future health reform legislation, respectively.
A. Theoretical Background
In theorizing and evaluating statutory delegations that give an
agency power to grant a state’s request to depart from a congressionally specified default, prior scholars have considered values of
policy substance, federalism, and administrative law like those
teased out in Part II. From the standpoint of substance, Professor
Stiglitz worries that states’ fiscal constraints and policy tendencies may tend to bias any policy variation under a waiver in favor
of disentitlements—in other words, states will be inclined predominantly toward changes that cut benefits and eligibility.135
Professors Jones, Miller, and Huberfeld offer specific evidence in
support of that concern in the context of the “Healthy Adult Opportunity” waiver concept.136 On the other hand, Professor Bagenstos
sees a substantive benefit of waivers if they give the federal government a chance to induce states to sign on to a cooperative federalism program (like Medicaid) that they would otherwise opt out
of,137 and Professors Gluck and Huberfeld see this playing out in
the ACA’s implementation.138 Moreover, Professors Gluck and
Huberfeld and Professor Bulman-Pozen each identify another
substantive benefit of waivers, namely, that the complexity (and,
135. Stiglitz, supra note 7, at 152 (“The forces that operate at the level of state
implementation tend to work towards cuts.”).
136. Miller et al., supra note 120.
137. Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 239-40.
138. Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 7, at 1737-40 (describing this dynamic in promoting
Medicaid expansion).
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often, lack of transparency) surrounding waiver decision-making
may allow agency and state experts to develop and implement
substantively desirable but politically unpopular policies by making
it unclear which government and which officials are actually responsible for the policy or by circumventing political officials.139
Meanwhile, Professors Barron and Rakoff counter arbitrariness
concerns surrounding waivers by arguing that they are more accountable than what they see as the alternative, “big delegation.”140
Barron and Rakoff explain that in a world in which broad delegations are the norm, having Congress specify a default from which
states and agencies may depart (an “opt out” approach to agency
discretion) is preferable to a blank slate delegation (an “active
choice” approach to agency discretion).141 In a similar vein, Professor Bagenstos explains that waivers in health care are preferable to
the alternative of agency nonenforcement; because agencies generally have broad discretion to decline to enforce grant conditions,
an agency without “big waiver” authority might simply refuse to
enforce a provision that it would prefer to waive explicitly.142
As discussed above, this prior scholarship has focused on the
regulatory components of “big waiver”: agency power to waive a rule
created by statute.143 Focusing on the fiscal components of “big
waiver”—agency power to alter a state’s funding from a baseline set
in statute—complicates the story, because regulatory requirements
and financial grants are different.144 The remainder of this Part
139. Id. at 1768-71 (describing “secret boyfriend model” of collaboration between lower-level
state and federal officials); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 7, at 979 (“[D]iscrete negotiations”
make health care waivers “particularly agile at differentiating federal schemes.”).
140. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 310.
141. See id. at 310-11 (“[I]t can be said that the combination of a specified statute and a
strong power to waive is less to be feared, and more to be welcomed, than the more direct
delegations we now accept as a matter of course. It might well be thought that the power to
waive, however great it is, is less conducive to creating unchecked rule by administration than
broad undifferentiated grants of regulatory power per se.”).
142. Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 236-37 (arguing that even where agency lacks statutory
waiver authority, a “regime of de facto waivers” may emerge from agency nonenforcement).
143. See supra note 7.
144. The difference between legal requirements that prohibit (or compel) and fiscal inducements that discourage (or encourage) is fundamental to American law and legal scholarship. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (contrasting property
rules that compel and liability rules that incentivize). Compare, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.
v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 563-74 (2012) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Constitution
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addresses two ways that fiscal waivers in health care show the
difference matters, but there are surely others that might be
uncovered and unpacked in future scholarship.
B. Delegated Scorekeeping
One clear difference between fiscal and regulatory waivers is that
fiscal waivers present fiscal questions; that is, questions about the
role of waivers within the federal system for accounting for and
regulating resource allocation. Another, more subtle difference is
that the alternative to fiscal waiver is different than the alternative
to regulatory waiver.
The alternative to regulatory waiver as Barron and Rakoff
describe it is “big delegation”—broad congressional delegation
without even a default set out in statute.145 This is not true in the
fiscal realm. The alternative to fiscal waiver in health care has been
congressional specification (what might be called “small delegation”), not big delegation.
Congress generally oversees federal spending closely, either leaving spending dependent on the annual appropriations process or
specifying the terms of permanent spending in statute.146 Thus, arguments in favor of “big waiver” that rely on ways that it is better

gives federal government power to tax Americans who fail to purchase health care), with id.
at 548-58 (holding that the Constitution does not give federal government power to compel
Americans to purchase health care). That said, the line between these categories can blur,
especially when “rules” are themselves merely legislative preconditions to grant eligibility.
See John Brooks, Brian Galle & Brendan Maher, Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden
Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229 (2018); Engstrom, supra note 13 (describing potential for
overlap between regulatory mandates and spending provisions). The discussion in Sections
B and C offer two ways in which, blurry though it may be, the distinction between fiscal and
regulatory authorities is a useful one.
145. Supra note 140 and accompanying text.
146. That the alternative to fiscal waiver in health care is congressional specification, not
broad delegation, is evident in the legislative history of health care waiver provisions
themselves. Medicaid’s waiver authority was added after the underlying program, including
detailed congressional specifications to cabin agency discretion, was already enacted. See
Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 7, at 1729 n.197 (explaining the history of section 1115). The
ACA’s waiver authority was added at the last minute at the insistence of one senator, again
after a detailed statutory scheme was well on its way to passage. See John E. McDonough,
Wyden’s Waiver: State Innovation on Steroids, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1099, 1102-06
(2014) (describing legislative history of ACA waiver).
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than “big delegation” do not apply when it comes to fiscal waiver,147
because the question is not whether fiscal waiver is better than “big
delegation,” but whether fiscal waiver is better than congressional
specification.
At the same time, comparing fiscal waiver to congressional
specification reveals a distinctive benefit associated with flexibility
in federal spending. The fiscal flexibility afforded by fiscal waivers
in health care mitigates a big substantive problem in health policy.
The problem, described in Subsection 1, is that legislative scorekeeping rules combine with fiscal fragmentation to impede desirable
federal investment in health-related public goods. The solution
presented by fiscal waivers, described in Subsection 2, is to delegate
the responsibility for scorekeeping from congressional scorekeepers
at the time legislation is considered to agency officials at the time
administrative action is implemented.
1. The “Tyranny of the Budget”
Statutes and congressional rules make it difficult to pass legislation that scorekeepers predict will increase expenditures more
than it increases revenues.148 These include PAYGO requirements
and discretionary caps that impede Congress’s ability to create new
costly programs in the mandatory or discretionary categories of the
federal budget without simultaneously eliminating or cutting
existing programs in these fiscal categories.149
It is difficult to overstate the significance of scorekeeping considerations in the contemporary federal legislative process.150 Such
147. See supra note 7.
148. ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 1-5 (3d ed. 2007);
David Kamin, Basing Budget Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 162-70 (2015)
(explaining the influence of the federal budget process); see OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra
note 78, at app. A (describing scorekeeping practices).
149. SCHICK, supra note 148, at 167-68 (describing PAYGO).
150. See id. at 72 (“As legislative ideas are bounced around, there is a lot of behind-thescenes interaction between budget scorers and politicians. Lobbyists and federal agencies
sometimes get into the act, trying to persuade budget specialists to score matters their way.”);
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare “Reform,” 36 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 287, 287 (1996) (“It is widely understood that the social safety net is being torn
apart by the rhetoric of budget necessity and professed American moral values.”); see also
Sage, Adding Principle to Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 2, 5-9; Steven D. Gold, Health Care
and the Fiscal Crisis of the States, in HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN
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considerations impact policy choices across the board, including in
infrastructure, education, emergency relief, and myriad other domains.151
Scorekeeping’s distortions are a partial explanation for a larger
underlying problem in health care, that of underinvestment.152
Scholars have documented underinvestment in health-related accessible transportation,153 housing,154 nutrition,155 preventing or
overcoming antibiotic resistance,156 hospital construction and workforce development (especially in rural areas),157 environmental protection,158 and education and investment regarding risks, such as
communicable disease, tobacco, safe drug use, and fall prevention.159
And scholars, especially legal scholars, have expressed concern
about underinvestment in less tangible but no-less-impactful levers
STATES, supra note 55, at 97 (describing at granular level impact of fiscal crisis on state
health policy).
151. See George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal
Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 188-92 (2009) (“Supporters of legislation have long used
various techniques to reduce the official cost of legislation and thereby enhance its likelihood
of approval.”).
152. In addition to the fiscal considerations described above, other structural pathologies
including public choice failures and interest group capture are also understood to play a role
in underinvestment in health and health care. See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate
in Public Health? Implications of Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1244, 1270
(2014) (collecting sources).
153. E.g., Len M. Nichols & Lauren A. Taylor, Social Determinants as Public Goods: A New
Approach to Financing Key Investments in Healthy Communities, 37 HEALTH AFFS. 1223
(2018) (focusing on transportation as example of underinvestment and noting that “[t]here is
growing awareness that funding for interventions related to social determinants of health has
long been inadequate”).
154. Lo Sasso et al., supra note 76; Leonard A. Jason, Margaret I. Davis & Joseph R.
Ferrari, The Need for Substance Abuse After-Care: Longitudinal Analysis of Oxford House, 32
ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 803 (2007).
155. E.g., Diller, supra note 152, at 1243-48 (documenting adverse impacts of federal and
state failure to invest in obesity and tobacco regulation).
156. E.g., Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic
Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 613, 645 (2010).
157. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weeks, Medicalization of Rural Poverty: Challenges for Access, 46
J.L., MED. & ETHICS 651 (2018); Thomas C. Ricketts, Workforce Issues in Rural Areas: A Focus
on Policy Equity, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 42 (2005).
158. See, e.g., Elise Gould, Childhood Lead Poisoning: Conservative Estimates of the Social
and Economic Benefits of Lead Hazard Control, 117 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. 1162, 1166 (2009)
(“For every dollar spent on controlling lead hazards, $17-$221 would be returned in health
benefits, increased IQ, higher lifetime earnings, tax revenue, reduced spending on special
education, and reduced criminal activity.”).
159. Masters et al., supra note 102.
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for promoting health, such as policy innovation, experimentation,
and improvement.160 (Of course, although health care is the substantive focus here, scholarly concern about underinvestment in
public goods is hardly limited to health care.161)
Professors Westmoreland and Sage document how some of this
underinvestment can ultimately be traced to scorekeeping rules,
which distort health lawmaking and so interfere with health reform.
What investments actually get made often depends on what is
included as a predicted expenditure (or source of revenue), what is
not, and how each is measured. Westmoreland categorizes several
discrete scorekeeping rules that shape health lawmaking, such as
discouraging long-term investment.162 Sage, who describes these
effects collectively as the “tyranny of the budget,” persuasively
presents the history of health reform at the federal level over the
past several decades as a history of efforts stymied or constrained
by budgetary considerations.163 And together, Westmoreland and
Sage catalogue how scorekeeping considerations shaped the ACA,
prompting design choices that ultimately made the Act vulnerable
in litigation.164
A feature of American health care that exacerbates scorekeeping
rules’ impact on health programs is the fiscal fragmentation across
160. See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism,
69 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2017) (analyzing peer review as a governance mechanism for food safety
inspections); Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and
the Old-Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1764 (2013) (describing a
“dearth of state-led policy experimentation”).
161. See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65 (2015)
(describing the lack of investment in experimentation in innovation policy); Zachary J. Gubler,
Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129, 140, 156 (2014) (expressing concern about
insufficient policy experimentation at the federal agency level and explaining the prediction
of public choice theory that interest groups’ incentive to ensure the entrenchment of the
policies they achieve will tend to cause underinvestment in reversability and so experimentation); Stephenson, supra note 77, at 1427-37 (describing underinvestment in “research,”
broadly defined); Michael Abramowicz, Tax Experimentation, 71 FLA. L. REV. 65, 67 (2019)
(describing the “empirical deficit” in the study of the effects of tax policies and calling for
greater experimentation in tax policy as a way to address this deficit).
162. Tim Westmoreland, Standard Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1555, 1590-92 (2007).
163. Sage, Ends and Means, supra note 2; see also DAVID G. SMITH, ENTITLEMENT POLITICS:
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 1995-2001, at 177-184 (2002) (describing the importance of
budgetary considerations in federal legislative process for health-care legislation).
164. Sage & Westmoreland, supra note 2.
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health programs, within the federal budget and beyond.165 At the
federal level, costs are categorized into two major categories,
“mandatory” expenditures (like Medicare and Medicaid) and “discretionary” expenditures (like COVID relief),166 and then further
categorized into programs (“Medicare Part A” or “Medicaid”), and
so on. Table 1 illustrates this: while the federal government bears
approximately 36 percent of Americans’ medical costs,167 that expenditure is spread out over numerous distinct programs, including Medicare,168 Medicaid,169 ACA,170 and employer subsidies,171 each
of which is budgeted and accounted for separately.172

165. See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Matthew B. Lawrence, Elizabeth Y. McCuskey & Lindsay
F. Wiley, Social Solidarity in Health Care, American Style, 48 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 411, 415
(2020) (describing fiscal fragmentation in health care). On the broader concept of
fragmentation in health and disability law, see Ani B. Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation in
Disability and Health Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 277 (2010).
166. Federal budgeting rules treat mandatory expenditures on programs like Medicare and
Medicaid as distinct from discretionary expenditures on annual programs, requiring that
increases in mandatory spending be offset by decreases in mandatory spending and that
increases in discretionary spending similarly be offset by discretionary decreases. See SCHICK,
supra note 148, at 57-61.
167. Abigail Moncrieff originally highlighted this point. Moncrieff, Federalization
Snowballs, supra note 70, at 848 (“[T]he federal government bears forty percent of the costs
of U.S. healthcare spending.”).
168. See generally Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t
Worked, 101 GEO. L.J. 519 (2013) (explaining Medicare). The federal government is
responsible, directly or through subsidies for Part C and D plans, for almost all of the medical
costs of the more than sixty-one million Americans enrolled in Medicare. BDS. OF TRS., FED.
HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. FUNDS, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2020),
https://www.cms.gov/files/document/2020-medicare-trustees-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LKM2-L8AP] (stating that the Medicare trust fund will “become[ ] depleted in 2026”). Through
Medicare the federal government paid a net of $583 billion in 2018 for medical costs. See infra
Table 1.
169. For a deeper discussion of Medicaid, see supra Part I.B.
170. For a description of ACA subsidies, see supra Part I.A.
171. See Brendan S. Maher, Unlocking Exchanges, 24 CONN. INS. L.J. 125, 142-43 (2017)
(explaining that health insurance is a federally subsidized employment benefit through which
a plurality of Americans obtain health care); John R. Brooks, Quasi-Public Spending, 104
GEO. L.J. 1057, 1059-61 (2016) (discussing similarities between tax expenditures and other
forms of government spending).
172. Cf. Elizabeth Weeks & Paula Sanford, Financial Impact of the Opioid Crisis on Local
Government: Quantifying Costs for Litigation and Policymaking, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1061
(2019) (illustrating fiscal fragmentation within state budgets by describing many different
components of states and localities that have been impacted financially by the opioid crisis).
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Table 1. Federal Share of Medical Costs Through Fragmented
Programs173
Program

Who?

How?
Direct
federal
expenditure

Medicare

65+, disabled

Medicaid

Very lowFederal
income (limited
payment to
to “deserving”
states
in some states)

ACA subsidies

Low-income

Federal tax
credit,
federal
payment to
insurers

Employer
sponsored
insurance (and
other tax
expenditures)

Full time
employees of
large- and midsized firms

Federal tax
deduction

Federal $

Federal %

$583 billion

90%-100%

$399 billion

53%-90%

$55 billion

1%-100%

$175 billion

10%-40%

173. Data on federal expenditures collected from: TAX POL’Y CTR., BRIEFING BOOK, https://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book [https://perma.cc/7MU3-6A4P]; CONG. BUDGET OFF.,
FEDERAL SUBSIDIES FOR HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR PEOPLE UNDER AGE 65: 2018 TO
2028 (2018); JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2018-2022 (2018); OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT BUDGET OF
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2020 (2019). These report nearly $1.1 trillion in direct
spending in 2018 with an additional $225 billion in tax spending. TAX POL’Y CTR., supra. U.S.
health-care spending was $3.6 trillion in 2018. NHE Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/StatisticsTrends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet [https://perma.cc/7T9CKR7U]; see also JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, supra (acknowledging similar expenditures); Press
Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Office of the Actuary Releases 2018-2027
Projections of National Health Expenditures (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/
press-releases/cms-office-actuary-releases-2018-2027-projections-national-health-expenditures
[https://perma.cc/2QR3-ZHTP] (projecting similar figures); Thomas M. Selden & Bradley M.
Gray, Tax Subsidies for Employment-Related Health Insurance: Estimates for 2006, 25
HEALTH AFFS. 1568, 1570-71 (2006) (estimating figures); Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs,
supra note 70, at 862-63 (discussing similar analysis); Huberfeld, supra note 93, at 474-76
(discussing similar analysis; collecting sources).
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Other direct
federal
expenditures
(Veterans,
workers
compensation,
Indian Health
Insurance)

Various

Various

$70 billion

Various

Indirect
federal costs174

Various

Various

Unknown

Unknown

TOTAL /
Average

Varies

Varies

$1.28
trillion

35.5% (of
$3.6 trillion
annual)

Coupled with scorekeeping constraints, the fiscal fragmentation
of costs into artificial categories prevents needed investment in
public goods by pushing reforms to be cost-justified within a given
narrow fiscal category. Put differently, this effectively impedes
state and federal investments that incur costs within one fiscal
category but create benefits within another category.175
2. Delegated Scorekeeping
In one sense, fiscal waiver authorities in health care illustrate the
potency of budgetary considerations. HHS is forbidden by statute
from using its ACA fiscal waiver authority to increase the federal
deficit.176 And while its Medicaid fiscal waiver authority includes no

174. The chart includes a line for indirect federal costs to fight the invisibility of important
but difficult-to-quantify costs left out of common accounting metrics, such as costs the federal
government absorbs through diminished tax revenues (because sick people are less able to
work) or increased payments in other programs such as the earned income tax credit. See, e.g.,
Council of Econ. Advisors, The Full Cost of the Opioid Crisis: $2.5 Trillion Over Four Years,
TRUMP WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (Oct. 28, 2019), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/
articles/full-cost-opioid-crisis-2-5-trillion-four-years/ [https://perma.cc/H253-9VUP] (explaining
how the federal government bears indirect costs associated with medical care); David W.
Brown, Amanda E. Kowalski & Ithai Z. Lurie, Long-Term Impacts of Childhood Medicaid
Expansions on Outcomes in Adulthood, 87 REV. ECON. STUD. 792, 795 (2019) (finding
increased earnings and lower use of social supports means “that the government recoups 58
cents of each dollar it spends on childhood Medicaid by age 28”).
175. Fuse Brown et al., supra note 165.
176. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1332, 42 U.S.C. § 18052.
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such requirement, HHS has self-imposed (albeit originally at OMB’s
insistence177) an analogous restriction on its use of that authority.178
At the same time, fiscal waivers offer a way to mitigate some of
the distortions of the budget process on health policy. A requirement
measured and enforced by Congress when legislation is considered
is a very different mechanism from a requirement measured and
enforced by an agency when a program is about to be implemented.
Delegating scorekeeping changes the “who” (from congressional
scorekeepers to agency) and “when” (from the enactment of legislation to program implementation) of scorekeeping.
Delegated scorekeeping predictably mitigates the “tyranny of
the budget” in four ways. First, program agencies naturally have a
comparative advantage over congressional scorekeepers in personnel and program expertise, which gives them the time and
competence it takes to predict secondary effects on revenues and
expenditures associated with changes in their programs. Whereas
scorekeepers generally ignore secondary effects, HHS need not do
so in administering fiscal waivers.179 Second, program agencies tend
to have a vested interest in their programs, and so motivation to
“count” secondary effects that make investment possible (though
this presents a risk of overly optimistic agency predictions).180 Third,
scoring at the program level rather than the legislation level reduces the uncertainty surrounding predictions by closing the time
gap between score and implementation, potentially reducing the
impact of scorekeeping’s blind spot for effects outside the budget
window (often ten years from a law’s enactment181). Fourth, an
agency tasked with ensuring deficit neutrality across federal
177. Supra note 49.
178. Supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
179. The reduced federal subsidy payments associated with Alaska’s reinsurance waiver
is an example of a “secondary effect” of federal spending on Alaska’s waiver that the agency
counted. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. Congressional budget law often does
not score for such effects. See Scott Levy, Spending Money to Make Money: CBO Scoring of
Secondary Effects, 127 YALE L.J. 936 (2018) (describing challenges to offsetting the “cost” of
an expenditure expected to produce savings against its anticipated “benefits”).
180. One way to address the concern that the error in estimating savings might skew
positive (toward overpayment) would be to limit spending permitted through delegated
scorekeeping to a fraction of the actual predicted savings estimated by an agency.
181. Outlook for the Budget and the Economy, CONG. BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/
taxonomy/term/26/recurring-reports [https://perma.cc/4DLK-2A2M] (referring to “the 10-year
period used in the Congressional budget process”).
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programs may have greater flexibility to pool otherwise fragmented
fiscal categories than scorekeepers bound by congressional budget
rules that enforce sometimes rigid distinctions between mandatory
and discretionary, and revenue and spending.
The effects of delegated scorekeeping (increasing expertise and
commitment, reducing uncertainty, and creating flexibility) combine
in the specific context of spending on states to make this mechanism
particularly valuable in health care. The health and cost impacts of
legislation that facilitates state policy changes is difficult to predict
at the time legislation is passed. At that time it is almost impossible
to know what specific state changes the spending will prompt—the
law must be enacted and states must respond to it first. By contrast,
in assessing a particular proposed state reform, HHS has the benefit
of this crucial information, and so some ability to acknowledge and
“count” ways that changes in state policy will ultimately increase
federal revenues or reduce federal expenditures.
Furthermore, one distinctive feature of delegated scorekeeping as
a partial solution to underinvestment in health care is that by
providing a way to “count” federal savings associated with health
improvement in budgetary conversations, it offers the potential not
only to overcome the “tyranny of the budget” but also to conscript it
in service of reform. As the Alaska reinsurance example demonstrates,182 investment can further rather than undermine the goal
of fiscal control by transforming investments in health-related
public goods from “costs” for budgetary purposes to “savings” for
such purposes. The potency of such budgetary arguments will only
increase in the years to come.183
Future legal scholarship might build on the fiscal waiver example
to explore further the potential of delegated scorekeeping, as well as
the mechanism’s risks. A key, of course, is assessing the circumstances under which congressional scorekeepers will be willing to
“score” a payment authority as “neutral” with a delegated scorekeeping requirement in place, as the Congressional Budget Office

182. Supra Part I.A.
183. Both the size of the deficit and the role of health care spending in that deficit are likely
to increase in years to come. See Neel U. Sukhatme & M. Gregg Bloche, Health Care Costs
and the Arc of Innovation, 104 MINN. L. REV. 955, 957 (2019) (“Medical spending is the fiscal
analogue of global warming.”).
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appears to have done with ACA programs.184 The growth of limitations in Medicare may be one example of delegated scorekeeping to
compare and contrast with the fiscal waiver examples.185
C. Waiver Denials as a Source of Agency Policy Control
Scholars, courts, and policymakers have focused on HHS’s use of
its waiver approval power, especially HHS decisions granting
waivers of questionable legality.186 On the flip side, waiver denials
have largely flown under the radar, as have threatened denials and
partial denials (approvals that award something less than the state
asked for).187 Shining a light on waiver approvals is appropriate and
184. For example, the ACA gave new experimental expenditure authorities to the Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation that are conditioned on the requirement that to be
implemented nationwide such new expenditures be projected to be budget neutral in the long
run by CMS’s Chief Actuary. 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(c)(2) (requiring that “Chief Actuary of [CMS]
certifies that [payments] would reduce (or would not result in any increase in) net program
spending under applicable subchapters”). The Congressional Budget Office does not appear
to have scored these new authorities as a cost of the ACA in developing its pivotal report
predicting the law’s fiscal consequences. See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong.
Budget Off., to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, at 4 tbl.5 (Mar. 20,
2010), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress-2009-2010/costestimate/amend
reconprop.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZ8A-LVRQ] (showing net reduction in spending as result of
creation of Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation).
185. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (Medicare payment provision featuring ten separate
authorities to adjust rates subject to budget neutrality constraints).
186. Id. § 1315(d) (requiring notice and comment for waiver approvals); see also Barron &
Rakoff, supra note 7, at 331-33 (suggesting that to satisfy administrative law values agency
must explain its decision to grant a waiver; not addressing whether agency should explain
decision denying waiver); id. at 327-30 (discussing “explanatory duties of an agency that
makes a change in regulatory policy by waiving a congressional requirement” (emphasis
omitted)); Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid, Work, and the Courts: Reigning in HHS Overreach,
46 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 887 (2018); David A. Super, A Hiatus in Soft-Power Administrative
Law: The Case of Medicaid Eligibility Waivers, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1590 (2018) (discussing approval of waivers requiring “community engagement,” also known as work requirements);
Julie Novkov, Unclaiming and Reblaming: Medicaid Work Requirements and the Transformation of Health Care Access for the Working Poor, 79 MD. L. REV. 145 (2019) (same); David
Wasserstein, Comment, Working 9 to 5? Equal Protection and States’ Efforts to Impose Work
Requirements for Medicaid Eligibility, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2019) (same); Thompson &
Burke, supra note 49 (focusing on process for approvals); Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 10304 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (invalidating Arkansas Medicaid waiver and holding arbitrary and
capricious agency’s finding that waiver would further objectives of the Medicaid statute), cert.
granted, 2020 WL 7086046 (Dec. 4, 2020) (No. 20-38).
187. One exception is the discussion in prior literature of explicit conditions on waivers—
which are a form of threatened denial—built upon below in Part IV. For other exceptions, see
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important, as they police the boundaries of permissible variation set
by Congress in the underlying statute. But it leaves much in the
dark about the influence of waiver authorities.
Waiver denials are an important source of agency policy control.
Part II described how HHS can use the power to deny fiscal waivers
to shape which potential reforms states actually pursue and which
potential reforms states do not pursue.188 HHS can wield its denial
power by tacitly or explicitly encouraging certain waivers and
discouraging others (whether through published guidance, public
statements, or private statements), by rejecting or refusing to
consider waivers that states do submit, and by approving submitted
waivers only in part, on funding terms that the agency sets.189
The fungibility of money and the variability of terms on which
money can be made available through partial denials make fiscal
waiver denials a more potent tool of influence than regulatory
waiver denials, generally speaking. To be sure, for a state that badly
wants a particular regulatory waiver, the threat of denial is an important tool for the agency.190 But that threat is useless to a state
that does not want that regulatory waiver or that has already received it. Fiscal waivers are not so limited a tool of influence. Every
state wants money, and in granting a fiscal waiver the agency
adjusts the state’s financial incentives going forward, thereby
steering state policy choices made well after the “approval” letter is
sent.
Critical normative questions about the desirability of fiscal
waiver authorities from federalism, substantive, and administrative
Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2107 &
n.295 (2008) (noting federalism implication of agency decisions denying state waiver
applications); Nicholas Bagley & Rachel E. Sachs, Limiting State Flexibility in Drug Pricing,
379 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1002, 1002 (2018) (describing lack of transparency surrounding
waiver denials).
188. Supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text (describing importance of denials, and
threat of denials, in shaping state incentives).
189. According to one empirical study, the agency much more often lets waiver application
languish until the state withdraws it or it lapses. Thompson & Burke, supra note 49, at 978.
The agency may also punt by asking the state to elaborate upon detailed, seriatim questions.
Id. at 996 (describing example of mid-1990s congressional committee chair having reams of
letters from a state “brought into the room in a wheelbarrow” in a hearing lamenting delays
in processing waiver applications).
190. E.g., Derek W. Black, Federalizing Education by Waiver?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 607 (2015)
(explaining state’s need for No Child Left Behind waivers).
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law perspectives depend in large part on the agency’s denial power
and how it is utilized. From a federalism perspective, a key question
is whether waiver dollars are used to inspire or to induce.191 The
point at which inspiration becomes inducement may be difficult to
identify with precision,192 but it depends on how much freedom
states have to select which reforms to pursue, and so on how states’
options are circumscribed by the federal government. Once the
universe of state reforms potentially eligible for federal funds is
defined by statute, the toggle an agency has to shrink that universe
and push the waiver authority’s effect from inspiration to inducement is the power to deny or threaten to deny lawful waivers.
Moreover, it is through threatened denials that the agency can
impose conditions on state applications, raising a distinctive set of
federalism questions discussed in the next Part.
From a substantive perspective, too, HHS’s waiver denial power
has proven pivotal. Denials can be substantively problematic either
by skewing state incentives under approved waivers toward
disentitlement or by stifling desirable experiments. It is through
191. Part II explained how fiscal waivers in health care can further federalism’s
experimentation value by restoring state innovation incentives that are otherwise depressed
by partial federalization or undermine experimentation as well as sovereignty and
accountability by inducing states to adopt particular reforms selected by the federal
government.
192. Like the associated constitutional line between inducement and coercion, drawing a
clean line between inspiration and direction is difficult. It demands deep specification of the
underlying federalism value (why is experimentation desired?). For example, depending on
why one values state experimentation, state “experiments” that are actually designed and
induced by the federal government may not be a bad thing. See Wiseman & Owen, supra note
73, at 1137-45; Madison, supra note 7. Drawing this line also demands either a fact-specific
analysis of an individual case or a rich theoretical understanding of how state policy officials
make decisions, and so what role the availability (or unavailability) of federal spending plays
in that decision. This difficult line-drawing exercise is intimately related to the elusive but
critical point “where persuasion gives way to coercion” that separates unconstitutional federal
coercion from permissible federal pressure under current constitutional doctrine, which line
the Supreme Court has felt “no need to fix.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
519, 585 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“The Court in Steward Machine did not attempt to ‘fix the
outermost line’ where persuasion gives way to coercion.... We have no need to fix a line
either.” (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591 (1937))). See generally
Gerken, supra note 12. Federal spending’s innovation impacts can be understood on a
continuum that ranges from pure inspiration (federal spending reduces barriers to state
innovation, such as by partial federalization), to inducement (federal spending steers state
to adopt particular federally favored reform), to compulsion (federal spending forces state to
adopt particular federally selected reform).
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denials and partial denials that HHS has constrained fiscal waiver
calculations to exclude long-term and cross-program savings, tending to bias states toward cutting benefits rather than investing in
health or quality.193 Through threatened denials federal officials
have discouraged more sweeping state-based reforms, such as single
payer.194 And through denials federal officials have the power to
punish states, whether for partisan reasons, any reason, or no reason.195
On the other hand, denials and partial denials can be substantively desirable when they prevent states from benefiting financially by cutting benefits and eligibility. This beneficial role for denials
plays a key role in the pioneer pathway proposal discussed in Part
V.
Finally, administrative law concerns raised by fiscal waivers also
stem largely from the agency’s power to deny lawful waivers.
Waiver approvals are today subject to a notice-and-comment-like
process that provides some opportunity for participation and some
protection against arbitrariness, two core ways administrative law
legitimizes agency action.196 But not so denials, as Bagley and Sachs
point out and is elaborated upon below.197 HHS has used fiscal
waiver denials (including partial denials giving states less than
hoped for) to make important judgments about the course of
national health policy, without even minimal procedural safeguards
like reason-giving or public participation. A statute that required an
agency to grant fiscal waivers that satisfied readily identified
statutory conditions (analogous to an entitlement) would, by contrast, not raise these administrative law concerns (even if it still
presented substantive and federalism concerns).198
193. See supra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2 (describing these limitations).
194. See supra Part II.B.2.
195. Supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing risk of weaponization).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(d) (requiring notice and comment for waiver approvals); 42 C.F.R.
§§ 431.400-.428 (implementing statutory notice-and-comment requirements); Gresham v.
Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 99-104 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (describing decision granting Kentucky waiver),
cert. granted, 2020 WL 7086046 (Dec. 4, 2020) (No. 20-38).
197. See Bagley & Sachs, supra note 187, at 1002 (decrying the lack of explanation
accompanying denial of Massachusetts’s drug-pricing Medicaid waiver application); infra Part
IV.A.1, infra note 222 and accompanying text (describing HHS’s assertion of authority to deny
waivers without explanation).
198. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism:
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IV. EXECUTIVE CONDITIONS
Giving HHS discretion to change the fiscal relationship between
states and the federal government can make sense, and, anyway,
the ACA and Medicaid currently do so. That leaves the question of
the scope of the agency’s discretion.
Any waiver provision, fiscal or otherwise, will have statutory
minima—legislative conditions that a state request must meet in
order for it to be lawfully granted. But what about agency authority
to impose additional terms or requirements beyond those created by
Congress, executive conditions that even statutorily eligible agency
requests must meet before the agency will grant them?
This Part integrates the foregoing analysis with prior “big waiver”
scholarship to address the question of executive conditions—that is,
conditions on when and how HHS should deny statutorily eligible
waivers. Section A begins with underlying legal issues, explaining
that the “black box” of modern fiscal waiver practice is susceptible
to previously unrecognized legal pitfalls surrounding executive conditions. Section B turns to normative questions, explaining how the
goals of preventing disentitlement, facilitating inducement, and promoting innovation counsel contradictory approaches to executive
conditions—the “black box” is good for inducement but predictably
facilitates disentitlement and discourages innovation. The next Part
turns to prescriptions.
A. An Executive Conditions Doctrine?
Agency-imposed terms and conditions on the award of state fiscal
waivers play such a pivotal role today that they can easily be
overlooked, taken as a given. Budget neutrality in Medicaid and its
associated (and sometimes problematic) formulae is an exemplar of
this—the statute does not require budget neutrality, but the agency
does. So, too, executive conditions are what makes HHS’s waiver
concepts work, and the agency’s ability to discourage innovative
reforms such as single payer reflects a condition on awards as

A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297, 319-20 (1996).
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well—an unwritten, nonbinding, suggestive condition that a request
not include single payer if it hopes to be granted.
Executive conditions in health care have not been free of legal
controversy. In Scott v. HHS, Florida sued HHS over the denial of
its request to renew a high-dollar fiscal waiver in Medicaid.199 The
state alleged that HHS had conditioned renewal of the waiver on the
state’s agreement to expand Medicaid.200 After failing to obtain
emergency relief, the state ultimately sought dismissal of its case as
moot, so it was never litigated,201 and scholars have not previously
addressed it. Nonetheless, the case presented an important question
that seems likely to recur: what statutory and constitutional
requirements apply to agency-invented conditions on federal payments to states?
1. Practical Differences Between Legislative and Executive
Conditions
The topic of legislative conditions on payments to states—of
federal statutes providing states money if they comply with statutory criteria—is explored in a significant body of case law and
scholarship.202 The topic of executive conditions has not been explored to the same degree. Yet it raises difficult questions. Does the
constitutional test for legislative conditions apply whole cloth to
executive conditions, or some version thereof? And when should a
statute be understood to empower an agency to impose conditions
on states?
Scholars previously addressed the question of executive conditions in the context of explicit conditions that the Obama administration put on regulatory No Child Left Behind waivers. States sure
to fall short of legislative conditions on funding under the statute
199. Pls.’ Memo, Scott v. HHS, supra note 111, at 1.
200. Id.
201. See Order, Scott v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:15-cv-00193-RS-CJK
(N.D. Fla. June 17, 2015), ECF No. 41 (stating that Florida withdrew its Motion for
Preliminary Injunction after “the Florida Legislature ha[d] agreed on a budget that
appropriates sufficient state funds to compensate Florida healthcare providers in the coming
month, which mitigates the threat of immediate harm”); Plaintiffs-Petitioners’ Notice of
Voluntary Dismissal, Scott, 3:15-cv-00193-RS-CJK (N.D. Fla. June 25, 2015), ECF No. 44.
202. E.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause
After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861 (2013) (describing this issue).
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sought waivers of such conditions, and the Obama administration
for a time imposed its own conditions on the grant of such waivers.
One state sued, though the issue was not resolved in court.203 To
oversimplify, scholars evaluating executive conditions in this
context generally conclude that they should be subject to similar
constraints as legislative conditions, albeit with a statutory interpretation gloss.204
This Article’s study of fiscal waivers in health care highlights a
key practical difference between legislative conditions and executive
conditions that could support a distinctive executive conditions
doctrine. Whereas legislative conditions are by definition memorialized publicly in statute, executive conditions may be unwritten or
undisclosed. Sidney Watson has aptly described agency/state
negotiation and deliberation about fiscal waivers as a “black box.”205
Much of HHS’s use of its denial power to influence states involves
executive conditions of various types and levels of transparency.
The agency’s current practice in Medicaid is to deny waivers for
any reason or no reason, often without even explaining its reasons
(or lack of reasons).206 As for ACA waivers, the agency is required by
statute to notify Congress of denials with an explanation of reasons,
but the agency can circumvent this requirement by letting an application languish for months, and reasons given may be cursory.207
The nonpartisan Government Accountability Office has repeatedly
lamented the arbitrariness and secrecy of the waiver consideration
and related process.208 While HHS has recently published guidance
203. See Jindal v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 14-CV-534, 2015 WL 854132 (M.D. La. Feb. 26,
2015) (challenge to condition on waiver of No Child Left Behind Act requirements on federal
funding).
204. Zachary S. Price, Seeking Baselines for Negative Authority: Constitutional and Rule-ofLaw Arguments over Nonenforcement and Waiver, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 235, 265-71 (2016);
Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 312-18. But see Black, supra note 190 (expressing legal
concerns about executive conditions).
205. Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and into the Light: Using Section 1115
Medicaid Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion, 15 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 213 (2015) (explaining current “black box” in which agency waiver
decisions are made).
206. See, e.g., Bagley & Sachs, supra note 187, at 1002.
207. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1332(d), 42 U.S.C. § 18052(d).
208. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 52, at 25; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-384, MEDICAID DEMONSTRATION WAIVERS: APPROVAL PROCESS RAISES
COST CONCERNS AND LACKS TRANSPARENCY 32-33 (2013); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
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explaining aspects of its approach to deciding whether to grant fiscal
waivers and how much to award, for years these fundamental
criteria were unwritten.209
The opacity surrounding denials facilitates a waiver decisionmaking process that involves repeated “informal negotiations”
between state and federal officials in which federal officials may
instruct the state on the telephone, over email, or in letters, what
steps the state must take in order to obtain approval.210 Indeed, a
consulting industry has sprung up in which experts with experience
in these private negotiations sell their knowledge and connections
to states hoping to secure desired waiver approvals on favorable
terms, and otherwise to maximize their payments through federal
health care programs.211 Former CMS Administrator Seema Verma
was a leading consultant in this field before being tapped for a
government role.212
2. Legal Vulnerability Associated with Identification of
Executive Conditions
The current lack of transparency surrounding the agency’s
decisions of which waivers to deny impedes enforcement of any legal
or constitutional restrictions on the agency’s authority to impose
GAO-14-689R, MEDICAID DEMONSTRATIONS: HHS’S APPROVAL PROCESS FOR ARKANSAS’S
MEDICAID EXPANSION WAIVER RAISES COST CONCERNS 13 (2014); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-08-87, MEDICAID DEMONSTRATION WAIVERS: RECENT HHS APPROVALS CONTINUE
TO RAISE COST AND OVERSIGHT CONCERNS 7 (2008); see also Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and
the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1741-43 (2016)
(critiquing “padding” in the calculation of the Medicaid waiver payment for the Arkansas
waiver and noting the tension between the budget neutrality requirement and encouraging
state innovation); Watson, supra note 205, at 217 (“The U.S. Government Accountability
Office ... has already called CMS to task for failing to ensure budget neutrality in the
Arkansas waiver approval.”).
209. See supra Part II.
210. See Pls.’ Memo, Scott v. HHS, supra note 111 (describing waiver negotiations); Gluck
& Huberfeld, supra note 7, at 1778-80 (describing “picket fence” relationships “between state
insurance experts and their federal counterparts”).
211. See Daniel L. Hatcher, Poverty Revenue: The Subversion of Fiscal Federalism, 52 ARIZ.
L. REV. 675 (2010) (describing revenue maximization consultants).
212. Tony Cook, Seema Verma, Powerful State Health-Care Consultant, Serves Two Bosses,
INDYSTAR (Nov. 29, 2016, 12:54 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2014/08/25/
powerful-state-healthcare-consultant-serves-two-bosses/14468683/ [https://perma.cc/LS65XDR7].
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conditions on waiver approvals. Take for example the constitutional
limits on Congress’s ability to impose conditions on funding for
states. In addition to the requirement that legislative conditions not
“coerce” states, the Supreme Court has instructed that conditions
must promote the “general welfare,” be “unambiguous[],” be relevant “to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs,” and not “induce the States to engage in activities that
would themselves be unconstitutional.”213 In the case of a nonpublic,
unwritten executive condition, ensuring consistency with these
boundaries is simply not possible.
A not-so-hypothetical illustrates the point. Readers will recall
that in 2020 President Trump was impeached for threatening to
hold up defense aid funding for Ukraine until the country agreed to
investigate President Biden’s son.214 This was a nonpublic, executive
condition on federal funding and would have remained so but for a
whistleblower. If the administration made a similar threat to a state
to deny or delay a fiscal waiver or waiver renewal unless the state
or one of its officials took some action or did some favor for the administration, that would be an obvious example of a likely unconstitutional condition (because not connected to the federal interest
in the underlying program, not advancing the general welfare, and
perhaps violating constitutional prohibitions on commandeering
state’s administrative apparatus). Yet if unwritten and nonpublic,
it would be very difficult for outsiders to identify the unconstitutional condition, let alone challenge it in court.
The dispute in Scott v. HHS illustrated this identification challenge. In that litigation, state officials swore under oath that they
believed the agency conditioned renewal of the state’s fiscal waiver
on the state’s agreement to expand Medicaid, which the state
213. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08, 210 (1987) (first quoting Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937); then citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936);
then quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); and then
quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)); see also
Bagenstos, supra note 202 (exploring potential understandings of doctrinal test post-NFIB);
Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal
Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 584-87 (2013) (describing Dole test).
214. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., B-331564, DECISION, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET—WITHHOLDING OF UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE 8 (Jan. 16, 2020) (“OMB
violated the [Impoundment Control Act] when it withheld ... funds from obligation for policy
reasons.”).
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alleged was unconstitutional.215 But in the litigation, federal officials
swore under oath that they had not done so, and that the threatened
denial was really about other considerations.216 Florida eventually
dismissed the case after failing to obtain emergency relief.217 It
surely would have been a difficult one given the evidentiary dispute
about whether federal officials had really conditioned funding and
remedial questions about the role of the court if the federal officials
had indeed imposed an unconstitutional condition but reversed
course once a case was brought.218
It might be that the state officials’ interpretation of the signals
they received in the Scott case was correct, or it might even be that
the state genuinely believed the federal government imposed a
condition that the federal government had not intended to impose,
which simply confirms that executive conditions present identification challenges that legislative conditions do not. For a state official
in the midst of informal negotiations on a waiver, it may be difficult
to tell which hints or suggestions about changes from federal
officials are conditions on approval, and which are truly mere
suggestions. For a court, telling the difference may well be impossible without a fulsome, contemporaneous record.
The potential informality and lack of clarity—from the perspective of both states and courts—surrounding executive conditions
could give rise to legal challenges either to approved or to denied
waivers. Such challenges might press on four arguable legal
vulnerabilities. The first comes from federalism restrictions on
federal conditions on spending for states. Should a future case like
Scott v. HHS be fully litigated, it is legally possible that a court
would hold that agencies must make waiver decisions through a
process that ensures transparency surrounding waiver conditions
in order to satisfy an executive conditions doctrine. The confusion
in that case about what conditions the agency had actually imposed
teed up just this sort of question. Requiring that agency reasoning
be made explicit in order to permit judicial review is a familiar
215. See Senior Decl., Scott v. HHS, supra note 111.
216. See Defs.’ Memo, Scott v. HHS, supra note 111 (exhibits including declarations from
federal officials disputing state’s reading of agency letter).
217. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
218. See Defs.’ Memo, Scott v. HHS, supra note 111 (offering these considerations as
reasons to deny Florida’s motion for relief).
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doctrinal “move” in administrative law.219 And if agencies can get
away with imposing conditions that Congress could not, then that
would create an incentive, problematic from the standpoint of federalism doctrine, for Congress to maximize federal power to
influence states by delegating conditional funding authority to
agencies, to be wielded away from the eyes of the courts and the
public.
An executive conditions doctrine requiring transparency in waiver
deliberation—or permitting discovery and cross-examination of
officials involved in negotiations in order to confirm or deny alleged
conditions—would represent a judicial innovation. But recent
Supreme Court attention to federalism limitations on federal
authority coupled with the novelty of executive conditions and their
potential for abuse may embolden courts to recognize new doctrines
to meet the new modes of governance in this area.220 Courts may be
concerned that insofar as constitutional guarantees are a blend of
the underlying standard and the likelihood of enforcement and
remediation,221 subjecting executive conditions to the same standard
as legislative conditions would produce a very different constitutional rule.
A second source of legal vulnerability for hidden conditions is the
legal question of the agency’s authority. Scholars have noted the
difficult interpretive question of whether a statute gives an agency
authority to condition waiver approvals.222 By writing out conditions
on approval publicly and in advance, an agency can bolster its
interpretive case, connecting conditions to underlying statutory
purposes. This possibility is absent, however, with an unwritten or
219. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (holding
that effective judicial review may require agency officials to testify regarding their reasons
for decision where contemporaneous administrative record is inadequate), overruled on other
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
220. Brian Galle has argued that, motivated as it is by concerns for political accountability
and experimentation, federalism doctrine should take account of the actual impact of a
particular form of federal spending on states as part of coercion doctrine analysis. Galle, supra
note 63; see also Brian Galle, Does Federal Spending “Coerce” States? Evidence from State
Budgets, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 989 (2014) (assessing “the danger that federal taxes will ‘crowdout’ state revenues”). Courts that accept this argument might particularly scrutinize fiscal
waivers when used to induce but not when used to inspire.
221. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857 (1999).
222. Price, supra note 204; Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 325-27.
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undeveloped condition expressed in the course of state-agency
negotiation.
A third source of legal vulnerability is the nondelegation doctrine.
This doctrine limits Congress’s ability to empower agencies to make
policy, though the standard courts use to judge nondelegation claims
is notoriously vague and currently up for grabs.223 Professor Black
has argued that executive conditions can violate the nondelegation
doctrine because they permit an agency to shape policy without
guidance from Congress.224 Black’s concern is exacerbated by the
practice of nonpublic unwritten conditions. Through both the
inspiration and direction functions of fiscal waivers, HHS may use
denials and threatened denials (that is, conditions on approval) to
influence which policy changes states seek to make.225 Because both
approvals and denials thus shape the course of national health
policy, both entail policy discretion, the nondelegation argument
would go, and so both must be subject to an intelligible principle set
by Congress.
The fourth source of legal vulnerability is the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). Litigants might challenge either waiver
denials or waiver approvals under the APA if the administrative
record fails to include communications between states and HHS
about the formulation of the state’s waiver, which may permit
223. Under the nondelegation doctrine, Congress may not delegate authority to an agency
without providing an “intelligible principle” to guide the agency’s exercise of discretion. J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (holding legislative action
delegating authority is permissible as long as “Congress shall lay down by legislative act an
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated
authority] is directed to conform”). Five Justices of the Supreme Court have recently
expressed interest in tightening this standard, with Justice Kavanaugh suggesting the Court
should closely scrutinize delegations giving agencies authority to make judgments that are
inherently policy based. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting) (stating, in dissent joined by Justices Roberts and Thomas, that he would have
held the statute to be an unconstitutional delegation, reviving doctrine); id. at 2131 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (stating “I would support” an effort to reconsider the nondelegation doctrine); Paul
v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting denial of certiorari)
(“Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine in his
Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in future cases.”). See generally Aditya
Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future
of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164 (2019). Thus, existing fiscal waiver authorities
may face constitutional scrutiny under a renewed nondelegation doctrine in the near future.
224. Black, supra note 190. But see Price, supra note 204, at 269 (doubting this concern).
225. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.

1538

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1477

judicial review. Waiver approvals are subject to ordinary arbitrary
and capricious review, and denials likely would be too.226 The DOJ
has argued that denials are committed to agency discretion by
law,227 and the courts have remained agnostic on that argument
even while asserting authority to review waiver approvals.228 But
courts might well reject the “committed to agency discretion”
argument as not only inconsistent with the statute but also as
raising avoidable constitutional concerns.229 The viability of such an
226. See Metzger, supra note 187, at 2107 (suggesting that more stringent judicial review
of waiver denials may be warranted because of the federalism implication of denials).
227. See Final Brief for the Federal Appellants 19-22, Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93 (D.C.
Cir. 2020) (No. 19-5096) (“Consistent with the broad grant of discretion and the nature of a
demonstration project, Section 1115 does not require that HHS provide an explanation for its
decisions. Nor does the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) .... Section 1115 similarly
commits to the Secretary’s discretion—and thus makes unreviewable—the judgment that a
demonstration project is likely to promote the Medicaid program’s purposes, and that waiving
particular requirements is necessary to facilitate the project.”), cert. granted, 2020 WL
7086046 (Dec. 4, 2020) (No. 20-38); see also 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
228. See Gresham, 950 F.3d at 98-99 (“The Medicaid statute provides the legal standard
we apply here: The Secretary may only approve ‘experimental, pilot, or demonstration
project[s],’ and only insofar as they are ‘likely to assist in promoting the objectives’ of
Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a). Section 1315 approvals are not among the rare ‘categories of
administrative decisions that courts have traditionally regarded as committed to agency
discretion.’” (quoting Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2568 (2019))). The court’s
carefully worded language avoids opining on whether denials are also outside the category of
decisions committed to agency discretion.
229. Under the “committed to agency discretion” exception to judicial review under the
APA, no judicial review is available (and so no agency explanation of reasons is necessary) for
certain narrow categories of agency judgments, such as where an agency exercises enforcement discretion or there is “no law to apply.” See Abbott Lab’ys. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140
(1967); 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 17.6, at 1591-95 (5th ed.
2010) (describing the presumption of reviewability); id. § 17.8, at 1648-53 (describing the
“committed to agency discretion by law” exception to APA review). DOJ argues that waiver
denials are such a judgment, because while the Medicaid statute and the ACA unambiguously
set out standards to constrain the circumstances when the agency may alter the flow of federal funding to states, these authorities can be read to provide “no law to apply” on the question
of whether the agency must grant a waiver whenever it has the authority to do so. Final Brief
for the Federal Appellants, supra note 227, at 21-22. The DOJ’s reading of the relevant
statutory authorities is a plausible one, but it is not the only one. While the Medicaid statute’s
grant of fiscal waiver authority to HHS is permissive—HHS is not compelled to grant a state’s
eligible request but simply “may” do so—it is nonetheless reasonable to read the statute as
setting out the factors that the agency should consider in making its decision, especially
whether granting a waiver promotes the purposes of the Medicaid statute. This reading would
therefore require the agency to limit its consideration to such factors and to explain its reasons in a contemporaneous, written decision reviewable under the APA. See Gundy v. United
States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (plurality opinion) (reading statutory purpose as constraint on decision-making in order to save it from a nondelegation doctrine challenge);
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argument would depend critically on the challenging party’s ability
to articulate a legally relevant distinction between waiver denials
and typical agency nonenforcement decisions.230
An important feature of APA review is the agency’s obligation to
compile an administrative record, including materials considered
either directly or indirectly by the agency in rendering its decision,
in order to form a basis for review and to articulate reasons for its
decision.231 In recent years courts have been increasingly assertive
in requiring fulsome records and permitting discovery, including
depositions of agency officials, where it appears that important
communications relevant to the agency’s decision were not included
in the record.232 It is therefore possible to speculate that a court
would do the same in a challenge by a state to a waiver denial, or
even a challenge by a third party to a waiver approval, that argued
that the waiver formulation and decision-making process featured

Gresham, 950 F.3d at 100-01 (finding required considerations in authorization of appropriations). The same is true of the ACA. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (describing the purposes
of ACA); King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 498 (2015) (same). Thus, the statutes need not be read
as precluding review of denials altogether. They can readily be read to do what many
delegations do in administrative law: leave the agency ultimate discretion but require the
agency to consider factors consistent with the statute in wielding its discretion and provide
a contemporaneous written explanation of its decision susceptible to judicial review. Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(holding agency action is arbitrary and capricious if agency, among other things, “relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider”); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) (concluding an agency action was arbitrary and capricious because
the agency considered cost in setting an air quality standard, but cost was not a permissible
consideration under the statute).
230. One promising such distinction is the simple fact that waiver denials are not nonenforcement decisions; they are denials of state applications. Courts routinely review agency
decisions denying applications for issues big and small. See, e.g., Boniface v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 613 F.3d 282 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (ordering judicial review of agency denial of
particular driver’s application for hazardous materials endorsement on license). It is not
apparent why state waiver applications should be any different. Another promising distinction
draws from the fact that waivers are requested by states, raising federalism concerns that
may counsel in favor of a greater judicial role. Cf. Metzger, supra note 187, at 2105 (“Agencies
should face a greater burden of persuasion and explanation when their decisions substantially
restrict state experimentation and traditional state functions.”).
231. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43; see 2 PIERCE, supra note 229, § 11.4, at 101834 (describing arbitrary and capricious test).
232. E.g., Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2551 (holding agency’s stated reasons for decision
were pretextual based in part on evidence obtained through discovery to supplement administrative record filed by agency).
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agency conditions that were not memorialized in the administrative
record.
To be sure, these potential legal vulnerabilities are just that,
potential vulnerabilities. To date, litigation surrounding waiver
denials has been rare, perhaps because the agency’s power over
states’ revenues through its fiscal waiver authorities discourages
states from suing for fear of retaliation.233
The fact that HHS’s denial power has avoided judicial scrutiny for
many years is a reason to be cautious about overstating its legal
vulnerabilities, but not a reason to ignore those vulnerabilities. The
recent history of health reform has been a history of litigation, with
the party holding the presidency being besieged (rightly or wrongly)
by novel but successful attacks that have unseated assumptions
about the law long taken for granted.234 At this writing, it seems
possible if not likely that President Biden will rely heavily on health
care waivers to pursue his health reform agenda and that this use
will become subject to political polarization that draws public interest litigation.235 Furthermore, given the increasing reliance on
233. Fiscal waivers in health care, and federal cooperative health care programs generally,
present many repeated interactions between states and the federal government in which
federal officials have discretion over payments to states. This discretion is present not only
when the agency decides whether to grant a fiscal waiver or calculate payment formulae
under that waiver, but also year-in and year-out as states actually apply for and receive their
matching fund payments under the waivers. In most of these interactions HHS not only
wields discretion but also does so in ways insulated from judicial review because unwritten
and unregulated. This repeated interaction creates a dynamic surrounding executive
conditions not present with legislative conditions. State officials have a vested interest in
maintaining positive relationships with their federal counterparts—a healthy “picket fence”
connecting players to one another. See infra note 240 and accompanying text. This predictably
discourages state officials from seeking relief through litigation even when faced with an
unconstitutional condition, because an offended federal official might have many future
opportunities to retaliate in subtle and unenforceable ways. By contrast, states need not fear
congressional retaliation in the same way (which is not the same as saying they need never
fear it), because congressional conditions are often set in permanent legislation that is not
easily susceptible to change.
234. Abbe R. Gluck, Mark Regan & Erica Turret, The Affordable Care Act’s Litigation
Decade, 108 GEO. L.J. 1471 (2020).
235. Press Release, Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force Recommendations 93 (July 8, 2020),
https://joebiden.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/UNITY-TASK-FORCE-RECOMMENDA
TIONS.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8TQ-KXEL] (“Democrats will empower the states, as laboratories of democracy, to use Affordable Care Act innovation waivers to develop locally tailored
approaches to health coverage, including by removing barriers to states that seek to experiment with statewide universal health care approaches.”).
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waivers, a future change in administration could see an administration rejecting, refusing to renew, or even terminating a waiver
solicited by its predecessor, again increasing the likelihood of
judicial scrutiny on the denial. In light of these possibilities, the
legal vulnerabilities of HHS’s denial power in general, and of hidden
conditions in particular, may well be tested in court.
B. Processes that Facilitate Steering May Undermine Innovation
Putting the legal risks surrounding executive conditions and their
manner of imposition to one side, how should fiscal waivers be
administered? The desirability of fiscal waiver authorities in health
care is itself a subtle question, as discussed in Part III. The question
of whether and how the agency should deny statutorily eligible
waivers for failure to satisfy agency-created conditions is more
subtle still. It depends in large part on which of the functions
differentiated in Part II fiscal waivers are intended to serve: inducement or innovation.
Executive conditions appear to be more effective tools of inducement if, as they are today, they are implicit, unwritten, and, from a
state’s perspective, unpredictable.236 From this inducement perspective, scholars have identified several potential benefits to informal
waiver negotiations that greater transparency might wreck. One
such potential benefit is that negotiation may permit the agency to
entice a state into adopting a beneficial reform it would not have
pursued if the agency could not negotiate over waiver terms; that is,
if the agency could not threaten to deny waivers absent the state’s
agreement to modify their application or comply with some other
agency-created condition.237 Another such potential benefit of negotiation is that it might provide an opportunity for state/federal
compromise that overcomes partisan gridlock to obtain policy
improvements.238 And another is the possibility that the obscurity
236. But cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 855-56,
875-76 (1998) (describing downsides of letting states “hold out” for more generous terms,
although ultimately concluding such concerns are “overstated”).
237. Bagenstos, supra note 7.
238. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 7, at 955-56 (suggesting “lack of transparency” in negotiation between state and federal officials about waivers “may be an asset”); id. at 1002-03
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about who is actually responsible for waiver-related reforms (the
state or federal government, and which actors in each?) permits the
adoption of desirable reforms that are politically unpopular for some
or all actors involved,239 as well as the formation of “picket fence”
relationships in which state policy officials have close working relationships not only with other state officials but also with their
federal counterparts.240
At the same time, more clarity and constraint surrounding
executive conditions would presumably make fiscal waivers a more
effective tool for inspiring state innovation. A state’s willingness to
invest in developing a promising proposal predictably depends in
part on the expected payoff of doing so. That payoff, in turn,
depends on whether the state can accurately predict whether a
proposal, once developed, would entitle it to a fiscal waiver award
or not (and if so, on what timeframe). Informality, delay, and
negotiation surrounding waivers all undermine such predictability.
Moreover, an agency that wants to maximize its substantive
influence may do so by limiting the waivers it is willing to consider
and thereby stifling experimentation. It is intuitively possible that
the leverage an agency’s power to deny state requests gives the
agency increases with the agency’s general reluctance to grant
eligible waiver requests. An agency that frequently denies eligible
waivers has more credibility in threatening to deny any particular
waiver, and no particular denial stands out as particularly unfair or
arbitrary when denials are routine. An agency that usually approves
eligible waivers, on the other hand, has less credibility in threatening denial and may face greater scrutiny for any particular denial.
If this dynamic plays out in practice, then the agency’s desire to
maximize its steering power would give it reason to exercise any executive condition power it had to foreclose true state experiments,
(arguing that the fact that negotiation occurs “in greater secrecy than legislative deliberation”
is an “advantage” of waiver negotiation in that it may help overcome political polarization).
239. See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 7, at 1700-01 (“[H]ybrids ... gave red-state officials
cover to entrench the ACA but arguably came at a steep price when it comes to accountability.
One official colorfully called it the ‘secret boyfriend model’ of state-federal relations—a
relationship coveted by the states, but one that states were unwilling to admit publicly for
political reasons.”).
240. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2001) (describing “picket fence federalism” but noting concerns
about such relationships).

2021] FISCAL WAIVERS & STATE “INNOVATION ” IN HEALTH CARE 1543
reserving approvals only for state adoption of federally desired
reforms. The result would be less experimentation and less policy
learning overall.
To be sure, process skeptics ordinarily worry that additional formality undermines rather than facilitates innovation.241 Any such
concern would be misplaced when it comes to formality surrounding
fiscal waiver denials, however. The rationales for experimentalists’
skepticism that procedure will discourage innovation—the increased
uncertainty and disruption for new innovations if invalidated by a
court242—apply only to judicial review of federal agency waiver
approvals. Formality surrounding denials poses little risk of disrupting approved projects; indeed, in this context even judicial
review would merely create a possibility that reforms stifled by the
federal government might be revived, increasing the predicted
payoffs to a state in terms of time and resources devoted to developing a proposal.243
Furthermore, clarity would also make it more difficult for HHS to
create conditions that steer agencies toward taking actions that
undermine statutory goals. The analysis in Part II of the formulae
by which HHS calculates budget neutrality in Medicaid is possible
today only because the agency has, after decades of pushing from
the Government Accountability Office, published a summary of
those formulae.244 With that clarity, advocates could more readily
241. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 74, at 356-57, 398-99 (expressing concern about the
potential of judicial review to stifle innovation); Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair
Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 981 (2011) (“[A]n administrative agency
should receive broader latitude to create an experiment than to create a new administrative
regime without an experiment.”); Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV.
345, 400-01 (2019) (arguing that broad agency discretion is often worth the risks of abuse
because it facilitates progressive reform).
242. See Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 33-35 (2014) (describing as downsides of judicial review the
uncertainty and intrusion of review itself and the stringent standards currently used by
courts to review agency action); see also William H. Simon, The Organizational Premises of
Administrative Law, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 92 (2015) (critiquing traditional
administrative law doctrine as out of touch with performance-based regulation).
243. One might worry that states would use the courts to force through waivers over the
objection of the administering agency. This concern is mitigated by the fact that any such
waivers would need to satisfy statutory eligibility requirements, and so necessarily would be
within the range of permissible waivers specified by Congress. It is a concern, then, that the
statutory scope of potential waivers might be too broad.
244. Supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
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challenge even approved waivers that they believed gave their state
an incentive to cut benefits or eligibility; opacity around the funding
flows and conditions of a waiver makes identification of such problematic incentives difficult. Furthermore, it stands to reason that
the ability to make conditions nonpublic and unwritten facilitates
agency-imposed conditions that are themselves inconsistent with
statutory goals to a greater extent than it facilitates agency-imposed
conditions that advance the goals of the underlying statute.
Thus, the question of the processes that should govern administration of fiscal waivers—and especially conditions on waiver
denials—is in large part a question of goals.245 If the goal is inducing
states to adopt policies favored by HHS (and, perhaps, the Congress
creating the fiscal waiver authority), then a flexible, informal
administrative process that conceptualizes waiver decisions as
inherently political may make sense. If the goal, on the other hand,
is inspiring states to develop promising innovations—or limiting a
hostile administration’s ability to undermine statutory goals—then
clarity and predictability may be warranted.
V. THE FUTURE OF FISCAL WAIVERS IN HEALTH REFORM
Political appointees in agencies and members of Congress will
inevitably decide for themselves whether to prioritize influence or
inspiration in designing or administering waivers. This Part turns
to prescriptions, taking the reality of HHS’s current inducementfocused approach as a starting point. Section A acknowledges that
under current law HHS will prioritize its own inducement power but
recommends that the agency formalize its use of executive conditions in order to avoid the legal pitfalls this Article identifies.
Section B suggests that Congress or HHS develop a distinctive
waiver pathway for pioneering and substantively promising state
reforms that features more clarity, predictability, and state flexibility than the default waiver process.

245. These implications are tentative and depend on questions further scholarship might
usefully develop, including the determinants of state innovation.
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A. HHS Should Formalize Waiver Negotiations
Under current law and given past practice, it is reasonable to
assume that HHS will continue to make inducing states adopt federally desired reforms a focus of its regulatory and fiscal waiver
practice. If so, HHS should endeavor to reduce the legal vulnerability of its process for administering waivers by bringing greater
formality—if not transparency—to that process. Doing so would
promote the agency’s power by insulating its waiver decisions
(whether to approve, deny, or revoke) from legal challenge, minimizing the risk of legal challenge that would create controversy, potential discovery, and less predictable standards than the agency
would adopt for itself.246
How should HHS improve the formality of waiver deliberation?
It should for the first time issue guidance describing protocols for
waiver negotiation between federal officials and states. That
guidance should provide that all substantive requirements will be
communicated to states in official correspondence, and that any informal communication by email, telephone, or other format should
serve only to discuss questions or logistics. Moreover, in any such
communications, the agency should endeavor to connect the factors
it considers to statutory authority.
This approach would have three main benefits. First, it would
mitigate federalism concerns by providing a basis for judicial review
of any conditions articulated by the agency, and also mitigate statutory concerns by allowing the agency subsequently to explain how
any conditions it did impose were consistent with its statutory
authority.
Second, having a stated system for tracking official communications as they happen would protect the agency against invasive
discovery in any litigation that might arise—the agency could argue
that officials need not be deposed or informal communications
reported because written correspondence captured all substantive
conditions.247 Absent such materials or practices in Scott v. HHS the
246. See supra notes 219-35 and accompanying text (describing possibility of litigation).
247. Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 396-410 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (addressing situations
in which agency should include ex parte communications relevant to its ultimate decision in
the administrative record).
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agency was forced to hastily put together declarations by agency officials recounting (and sometimes disputing the state’s version of )
informal and formal communications between agency staff and
states.248 Third, this approach would guard against arbitrary and
capricious challenges (by providing reasoning) and nondelegation
claims (by connecting the agency’s judgment to statutory criteria).249
As an additional step, the agency might consider putting its
guidance documents articulating its waiver priorities and practice
through notice-and-comment rulemaking.250 This would help ensure
the agency’s interpretations of its statutory authorities receive
Chevron deference251 and provide a vehicle for judicial resolution of
any disputes about invited waiver concepts ex ante, without forcing
a state first to apply for a waiver and receive it only to have it overturned in court after much time and effort, as happened with work
requirements.252
B. The Case for a Pioneer Pathway
In addition to greater formality in waiver negotiations, Congress
or HHS should create a pioneer pathway focused on stimulating
novel state reforms—on maximizing fiscal waivers’ innovation
function. Subsection 1 explains that expansion of federal health care
coverage (through Medicare for All or otherwise) would sharpen the
need for fiscal waivers, deepening the fiscal fragmentation problem
that makes delegated scorekeeping particularly valuable. Subsection 2 explains the Article’s proposed pioneer pathway.

248. See Defs.’ Memo, Scott v. HHS, supra note 111 (declarations included in exhibits,
along with emails and letters exchanged between state and agency officials).
249. Cf. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (to permit
judicial review, agency officials must either testify to their reasons or prepare contemporaneous written explanation).
250. Miller, Huberfeld, and Jones suggest that agency invitations for waiver applications
fitting specific agency-defined criteria are “substantive rules” for purposes of the APA, and
so the agency does not have the legal authority to avoid notice and comment rulemaking in
issuing such guidance. Miller et al., supra note 120, at 16. This is a challenging argument
because such invitations are styled as nonbinding guidance, and guidance is not ordinarily
subject to notice and comment requirements. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
251. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
252. Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 2020 WL 7086046 (Dec.
4, 2020) (No. 20-38); Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 260 (D.D.C. 2018).
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1. Expansion of Federal Role Would Not Alleviate
Tyranny of the Budget
The ACA did not include any kind of waiver (whether fiscal or
regulatory) until the last minute, when Senator Ron Wyden pushed
for one.253 Moreover, prominent current health reform proposals,
such as Medicare for All, do not include waiver authorities.254 One
might assume that because a greater federal role in health care
would reduce states’ fiscal role, a fiscal waiver would be unnecessary in future legislation significantly expanding the federal role in
health care.255 This would be incorrect, however.
Although in some ways greater federalization would reduce fiscal
fragmentation concerns, in other ways it would deepen them.
Constitutional, practical, and political constraints on the federal
government’s regulatory and spending powers limit the federal government’s ability to influence upstream determinants of the cost of
health care itself, namely, regulation of health care and of the social
determinants of health.
The 2020 coronavirus pandemic provides a stark and tragic
reminder that health outcomes in the United States are a function
of a broad range of interrelated determinants. The medical care
253. See McDonough, supra note 146, at 1102-04 (describing legislative history of ACA
waiver).
254. Nicole Huberfeld, Is Medicare for All the Answer? Assessing the Health Reform Gestalt
as the ACA Turns 10, 20 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 69, 87 (2021) (“The Sanders bill does not
address whether HHS would retain demonstration waiver authority.”); see also Medicare for
All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. (2019) (universal national coverage bill proposed by
Senator Sanders); Medicare for All Act of 2019, H.R. 1384, 116th Cong. (2019) (universal
national coverage bill proposed by Representative Jayapal); Sage, Adding Principles to
Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 5-11 (surveying various proposals for expanded or universal
federal health care coverage). Fuse Brown and McCuskey offer an ERISA waiver as a way to
solve ERISA’s tendency to inhibit state reform, explicitly taking as inspiration Medicaid and
ACA waivers. Erin C. Fuse Brown & Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Federalism, ERISA, and State
Single-Payer Health Care, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 389 (2020); see also Mary Anne Bobinski,
Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing Health Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 255 (1990) (early treatment addressing how ERISA impedes state innovation).
Their proposed waiver does not include a fiscal waiver authority. See Fuse Brown &
McCuskey, supra, at 446 n.296 (treating as a separate question beyond the article’s scope
implications of “federal tax preference given to employer-sponsored health insurance”).
255. As Professor Moncrieff understood it, significant intersovereign spillovers leave the
federal government with “a decision between federalizing ... and devolving healthcare
spending.” See Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs, supra note 70, at 877-78.
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actually provided by one’s doctor when she is sick is of course the
most visible such determinant.256 But there are many less-visible
but important determinants that influence the cost, quality, and
availability of medical care. Innovation policy (including but not
limited to intellectual property) determines what technologies and
drugs medical professionals might have at their disposal and what
they cost.257 Scholars have repeatedly described how regulations
and infrastructure policies—including professional licensure rules,
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, accreditation standards,
and certificate-of-need laws—determine whether providers will be
available, in what form, what they will cost, how much wasteful care
they will provide, and where and when innovation happens.258 And
health insurance itself influences at what stage of illness patients
seek medical help, as well as the treatments and services their
providers recommend when they do.259
Moreover, medicine is only a piece of the puzzle. Public health
scholars have been emphasizing for some time that while the cost,
quality, and availability of medical care are important determinants of health outcomes in the United States, health outcomes have
256. See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, The New
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2281, 2281-82 (2003).
257. Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation
Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 157 (2016).
258. See Allison K. Hoffman, What Health Reform Reveals About Health Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW, supra note 2, at 49, 61 (“[H]ealthcare regulation can
have paralyzing effects on innovation, especially in healthcare delivery.”); William M. Sage,
Fracking Health Care: How to Safely De-Medicalize America and Recover Trapped Value for
Its People, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 635, 647 (2017) (“[A]n astonishing amount of health care
spending is plausibly unnecessary.”); see also Gabriel Scheffler, The Dynamism of Health Law:
Expanded Insurance Coverage as the Engine of Regulatory Reform, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 729,
768 (2020) (summarizing the significant extent to which health care cost, quality, and access
are held back by outdated laws regulating health care providers including licensing, corporate
practice, and certificate-of-need laws); William M. Sage, Explaining America’s Spendthrift
Healthcare System: The Enduring Effects of Public Regulation on Private Competition, in THE
LAW AND POLICY OF HEALTHCARE FINANCING 17, 34-36 (Wolf Sauter et al. eds., 2019) (calling
for a new turn in health policy “to the task of facilitating decentralized, incremental improvement” in order to “liberat[e] resources that are currently trapped in America’s grossly
inefficient healthcare system by accreted health law”); cf. COMM. ON THE LEARNING HEALTH
CARE SYS. IN AM., INST. OF MED., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINUOUSLY
LEARNING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 102 (Mark Smith et al. eds., 2013) (estimating $750
billion annual waste in U.S. health care system).
259. Lawrence, supra note 82 (describing the impacts of health insurance on health-care
quality and access).
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numerous other important, upstream determinants.260 Vulnerability
theory has developed an analogous but more general insight about
the importance of state-influenced structures in promoting resilience.261 Social, environmental, and behavioral factors—such as
marital or family status, income, nutrition, air quality, housing,
employment, education, and racism—all contribute in significant
and predictable ways to a person’s health.262
In fact, these social determinants of health are collectively more
influential than medical care in determining health care costs and
outcomes.263 Relatedly, many health policy scholars believe the
reason the United States spends much more on health care than
other developed countries but gets comparatively worse health
outcomes—what Bradley and Taylor call the “American Health Care
Paradox”264—is that the United States spends too little on social
services to prevent illness and too much on health care to cure the
illnesses it failed to prevent.265
Medicare-for-All proposals do not, and constitutionally could not,
propose federal takeover of all professional regulation or the provision of social services in the United States.266 Therefore, even if
260. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT 5 (3d ed. 2016); Scott Burris, From Health Care Law to the Social Determinants
of Health: A Public Health Law Research Perspective, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1652-54 (2011).
261. E.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 13 (2008) (“[S]tate facilitated institutions ....
provide individuals with resilience in the face of vulnerability.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
262. Yearby & Mohapatra, supra note 10, at 1-4; Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, The Body Politic:
Federalism as Feminism in Health Reform, 11 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 303, 308-10
(2018); Lindsay F. Wiley, From Patient Rights to Health Justice: Securing the Public’s Interest
in Affordable, High-Quality Health Care, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 833 (2016).
263. ELIZABETH H. BRADLEY & LAUREN A. TAYLOR, THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE PARADOX:
WHY SPENDING MORE IS GETTING US LESS 13-14 (2013).
264. Id. at 2-3.
265. Id. at 15, 71-72 (showing the United States spends much less on health-related social
services other than medical care—such as employment counseling, housing, and paid parental
leave—than comparable countries and noting the same correlation between spending on social
services and health care costs repeats at the state level); id. at 173 (noting need for “shared
accountability” for health costs in order to overcome the “American health care paradox”).
266. It is conceivable that a single-payer or other plan for increasing federal responsibility
for health care costs would also entail the federal takeover of responsibility for housing costs,
transportation costs, infrastructure costs, education costs, and the regulation of medical
practice. See Wiley, supra note 7, at 891 (“Federal single-payer health care could prompt
further federalization.”). No current plans propose this, and constitutional, historical, and
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such proposals were adopted, the states would continue to play a
lead role in regulation of their health care systems and of the social
determinants of health. Medicare for All would thus deepen the
problem even as it limited it. The federal government would now
bear total responsibility for Americans’ medical costs, while the
states would continue to hold substantial regulatory authority over
the myriad determinants beyond health-care coverage itself that
ultimately influence both residents’ likelihood of needing medical
care and the cost of that care. Absent some mechanism to link
federal costs with state investments, such as shared federal savings
through fiscal waivers, the combination of high health care costs
with low social services spending documented by Bradley and Taylor
would be locked in place or even exacerbated as the entity responsible for paying those high health care costs would be different than
the entities (the states) with primary authority over professional
regulation and the social determinants of health.
2. A Pathway for Pioneering Reforms Should Include
More Predictability and Fiscal Flexibility for States
Fiscal waivers have a role to play in the future of health reform
for their inspiration function, not just their inducement function—so
long as fiscal waivers’ capacity to inspire can be tapped without
risking abuse. This Article’s study of fiscal waivers in the ACA and
Medicaid offers guidance for how a pioneer pathway might be
structured for development by HHS or inclusion in future health
reform legislation to serve as a necessary stepping stone to greater
innovation in health reform while avoiding the risk of abuse and

practical considerations make it likely that states will continue to have significant influence
over their residents’ health. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 533-36
(2012) (describing the constitutional limitation of the federal role to enumerated powers);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905) (“State[s] did not surrender [the police
power] when becoming ... member[s] of the Union.”); Huberfeld, supra note 56, at 200-05
(describing the increasing, but still limited, federal role in health regulation over time from
the Founding Era to present day). See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982) (describing the history of the regulation of medicine in states).
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mitigating administrative law and federalism concerns.267 This
pathway could be structured as follows.
a. Carefully Constrain Awards
First, and foremost from a health policy perspective, payments
through a fiscal waiver must not reward states for reducing utilization of health care. Increasing states’ financial interest in
reducing utilization, as the Trump administration sought to do,268
undesirably encourages states to cut benefits and eligibility despite
adverse health and equality impacts of such cuts.269 On the other
hand, rewarding investments in health-related public goods or
equality, as in the Alaska reinsurance program financed through
the ACA’s pass-through provision, desirably encourages states to
make such investments while circumventing budgetary constraints.
This substantive focus on risk sharing is analogous to other
cutting-edge health care financing tools. Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs), which came to the fore in the 1990s, were a
relatively early effort to share health care costs (and so savings)
between health insurers and providers by having providers work
directly for insurers,270 because of the acknowledged benefit of
encouraging coordination. HMOs inspired widespread backlash due
to significant concerns that physicians’ new financial interest in
their patients’ care costs led them to reduce costs by avoiding

267. Public health scholars have recently noted the need for some entity to coordinate
community investment in social determinants of health. Len M. Nichols & Lauren A. Taylor,
Social Determinants as Public Goods: A New Approach to Financing Key Investments in
Healthy Communities, 37 HEALTH AFFS. 1223 (2018). A pioneer pathway would empower
states to play this role.
268. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text. From the standpoint of the underlying
entitlement programs and of mainstream normative perspectives that assign the government
a role in ensuring the health of residents and problematize health disparities, cuts to benefits
and eligibility despite adverse health impacts are bad and investments in health-related
public goods are good. See supra notes 60-61 (explaining normative perspectives and statutory
purposes on which disentitlement is undesirable).
269. See David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633,
640-59 (2004) (offering taxonomy of senses in which word “entitlement” is used).
270. See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws:
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-5
(1999) (describing the genesis of HMOs).
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necessary treatment rather than merely by avoiding unnecessary
treatment or promoting patient health.271
The difficulties that arose from HMOs’ complete commingling of
professional and financial incentives did not foreclose forever the
promise of sharing savings between providers and payers to promote
better health care. Scholars and policymakers realized that careful
attention must be paid to which risks are shared, which determines
how the recipient exercises its discretion in order to attempt to
reduce costs.272 The lesson in health care was to share risks related
to the quality of care and patient health outcomes, but not to share
risks related to utilization (how many patients are eligible for and
seek care, and how much care they seek), while setting quality
criteria that an entity must continue to satisfy in order to receive
payment.
So it is that, two decades after “HMO” became a four-letter word,
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are a centerpiece of the
ACA’s effort to reform health care. ACOs permit groups of physicians organized together to become entitled to financial reward if
their patients incur reduced Medicare costs.273 Far from unpopular,
ACOs are seen as a promising model for the future of health reform
and were a centerpiece of the ACA’s efforts to bend the cost curve.274
Like HMOs, the structure of ACOs gives physicians some financial
stake in their patients’ costs. But ACOs are not thought to carry the
same potential for abuse as HMOs because federal savings are

271. See David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong with a Patient Bill of
Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 222 (2000) (describing laws proliferating in response to the
backlash).
272. See Donald M. Berwick, Launching Accountable Care Organizations—The Proposed
Rule for the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED., no. 16, 2011, at 1-2
(describing how shared savings in ACO program mitigates risks of abuse).
273. Some ACOs also take on the risk of increases in Medicare costs. See DAVID NEWMAN,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41474, ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MEDICARE
SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM (2011).
274. Id.; see also Berwick, supra note 272 (explaining that by sharing savings between
“physicians, hospitals, public or private payers, or employers,” ACO programs overcome the
“[f]ragmentation” that “leads to waste and duplication”); NEWMAN, supra note 273 (collecting
sources on shared savings between hospitals and other payers); Erin C. Fuse Brown & Jaime
S. King, The Double-Edged Sword of Health Care Integration: Consolidation and Cost Control,
92 IND. L.J. 55, 63-64 (2016) (describing shared savings in Medicare between providers and
payers); Bagley, supra note 168, at 574-77 (discussing shared savings in ACA).
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shared carefully, with a focus on ensuring ACOs are not rewarded
for preventing patients from obtaining care.275
Fiscal waivers could do the same. Ensuring that fiscal waivers are
not used to reward states for reducing utilization actually becomes
easier as federal responsibility for health care costs grows, because
states would have a diminished ability to interfere with their
residents’ utilization in the first place. Today the problem is that
states receive awards through fiscal waivers in programs they
administer and share financial responsibility for—such as Medicaid—and so can readily tailor forms, coverage decisions, or enrollment processes to keep beneficiaries out. Prominent Medicare
for All proposals do not leave states any such administrative role.
Three further steps, drawn from prior experience with ACOs and
the ACA, can ensure that states are not rewarded for decreased
utilization. First, any proposed statute should include judicially enforceable guardrails that make fiscal waivers unavailable for any
reform that negatively impacts the affordability of coverage, the
comprehensiveness of coverage, or the generosity of coverage for
any state resident. The ACA includes analogous guardrails but they
are written less clearly than they could be, and the Trump administration interpreted them in ways that risked harm to many state
residents.276 Future legislation should instead include explicit
criteria that align with the Obama administration’s (since rescinded) interpretive guidance.277 Second, this statute should
provide for close federal oversight of and reporting on a state’s
compliance with these guardrails during the life of a fiscal waiver,
a step that Miller, Huberfeld, and Jones explain helped Vermont’s
and Rhode Island’s Medicaid waivers avoid encouraging disentitlement.278 Third, as is a common step in mitigating adverse
incentives, the statute should require any federal savings shared
275. NEWMAN, supra note 273, at 5-6.
276. See State Relief and Empowerment Waivers, 83 Fed. Reg. 53,575 (Oct. 24, 2018); Katie
Keith, Feds Dramatically Relax Section 1332 Waiver Guardrails, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Oct.
23, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20181023.512033/full/ [https://
perma.cc/Q463-G69G] (“[T]he new guidance .... significantly relaxes the standards outlined
in the [Obama administration’s] guidance.”).
277. Waivers for State Innovation, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,131 (Dec. 16, 2015).
278. See Miller et al., supra note 120, at 10-11 (describing limitations on Vermont and
Rhode Island waivers, along with close oversight, that helped prevent these waivers from
creating the problematic results associated with block grants).
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with states be calculated on a per capita basis rather than on an
overall population basis.
b. Guarantee Awards and Waive Budget Neutrality for
Potentially Transformative State Requests
Two particular issues hold back fiscal waivers’ capacity to inspire
state reforms today. First, current consideration and formulae do
not reward the first state to develop or demonstrate the effectiveness of a reform for doing so. Currently, the seventh state to implement a health investment financed by a fiscal waiver is entitled to
the same federal award as the first. Yet research on state policy
innovation has borne out Rose Ackerman’s prediction that the costs
of trying a policy are the greatest for the first-moving states and
that once one state shows a policy works, others will soon follow.279
To solve this problem and increase the extent to which fiscal
waivers serve an inspiration function rather than merely directing
state reforms, a pioneer pathway (analogous to the NIH’s “pioneer
award” for innovative research) should reward early adopters.280
Rewards might include lessened budget neutrality requirements or
public praise. The value of additional fiscal support in facilitating
startup costs is obvious. As for praise, by publicly and ostentatiously
awarding grants to pioneering states (who want the publicity),
federal agencies wielding fiscal waiver authorities would give credit
for the investment to the political actors in states whose time, effort,
political capital, and state apparatus are necessary to it. It would
thereby concentrate political accountability for such investments in
the states rather than split such accountability between elected
state policymakers and unelected agency officials or the President.
A second problem today is that HHS is fickle. It reserves the right
to deny waiver requests that satisfy statutory eligibility requirements, and often does so, or delays in responding to state requests
altogether. This means that from a state’s perspective, there is no
279. Sparer & Brown, supra note 75, at 192 (“States do look at and learn from other
states.”); supra note 67.
280. See NIH Director’s Pioneer Award Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L INSTS. OF
HEALTH, https://commonfund.nih.gov/pioneer/faq [https://perma.cc/69J2-25NY] (offering
pioneer award for creative and innovative biomedical researchers to fund cutting-edge
research).
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good way to tell whether time and effort put into developing a
waiver proposal would be well spent—predictably reducing the
payoff from such investment and, so, stifling innovation. Imagine
working on an invention if the Patent Office retained the authority
to reject a patent for any reason or no reason, and there were no
legal recourse to challenge such rejections.
To solve this problem, a pioneer pathway, whether created by law
or regulation,281 should require that HHS grant any state request
that satisfies pathway-specific eligibility criteria (above and beyond
statutory minima for waiver eligibility), and further provide that
such requests would automatically be granted if not denied within
a set period of time—say a few months after submission. To ensure
that this requirement would not overwhelm the agency’s resources,
the eligibility criteria might include a limitation on state applications; for example, states might be limited to submitting one “pioneer” waiver application every two years. As for the criteria, they
should limit eligibility to novel reforms carrying the potential, if
successful, to spur adoption at the federal level or in other states. Of
course, the greater the specification in the statute or regulation
creating the pathway about how these concepts of novelty and potential would be assessed, the more predictability the pathway
would provide to states and, so, the greater its potential to stimulate
innovation.
Finally, relaxed budget neutrality requirements might be coupled
with the mandatory grant of eligible waivers. Waivers with the
potential to bring savings nationwide or in other states if successful
long term could be approved even if resource-intensive in the short
term. The ACA’s Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation
waiver authorities permit the agency to reimburse providers nationwide for expenses not otherwise payable in Medicare or Medicaid.282
This authority requires budget neutrality to be used nationwide in
the long term, but not for an initial test to demonstrate proof of
concept in the short term.283 A similar approach could be used to
281. The goal of predictability described here would not necessarily require judicially
enforceable constraints on the agency; internal controls could suffice as well. See generally
Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239
(2017) (describing internal checks on agency behavior).
282. See supra note 184.
283. 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(3).
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reward promising state reforms, recognizing that a state innovation
is ordinarily costliest in the first state to adopt it.
CONCLUSION
HHS can use fiscal waiver authorities in Medicaid and the ACA
to influence state health policy either by inspiring state innovation
or by steering the course of health policy, encouraging some state
reforms with financial awards and discouraging others by refusing
waivers. This influence makes these fiscal waiver authorities a
double-edged tool from the perspectives of substantive policy, federalism, and administrative law. Fiscal components increase the
benefits and risks of “big waiver” in health care. Fiscal waiver
authorities offer a way to avoid the “tyranny of the budget” that
otherwise impedes health reform, but such authorities also give the
agency a power to deny funds to states (and so condition the award
of such funds) in ways that can be problematic. Indeed, hidden
executive conditions represent a distinctive method of governance
that may be subject to future judicial scrutiny under federalism and
administrative law doctrines, if and when courts are called upon to
adjudicate a waiver denial or partial denial. HHS could minimize
legal risk by adopting greater formality in its use of its fiscal waiver
authorities, and future health reform legislation including fiscal
waiver authorities could make such formality mandatory as part of
a pioneer pathway.
Finally, this Article underscores the need for greater understanding of the interaction between fiscal federalism and state innovation
and develops fiscal waivers as an example of how legal structures
shape and are shaped by that interaction. Fiscal waivers are part of
the problem with federalism in American health care, but they can
also be part of the solution.

